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Abstract
We desire a capability for the safety monitoring of complex, mixed hardware/software
systems, such as a semi-autonomous car. The field of runtime verification has developed
many tools for monitoring the safety of software systems in real time. However, these
tools do not allow for uncertainty in the system's state or failure, both of which are
essential for the problems we care about. In this thesis I propose a capability for
monitoring the safety criteria of mixed hardware/sofware systems that is robust to
uncertainty and hardware failure.
I start by framing the problem as runtime verification of stochastic, faulty, hidden-
state systems. I solve this problem by performing belief state estimation over a novel
set of models that combine Biichi automata, for modeling safety requirements, with
probabilistic hierarchical constraint automata, for modeling mixed hardware/software
systems. This method is innovative in its melding of safety monitoring techniques from
the runtime verification community with probabilistic mode estimation techniques
from the field of model-based diagnosis. I have verified my approach by testing it on
automotive safety requirements for a model of an actuator component. My approach
shows promise as a real-time safety monitoring tool for such systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis provides a capability for the safety monitoring of embedded systems with
stochastic behavior that have hidden state and may fail. I accomplish this by framing
the monitoring problem as that of Bayesian belief state update on a combined plant
and safety state. Knowledge of plant behavior is encoded as a stochastic model with
discrete states.
1.1 Lifelong Runtime Verification of Stochastic,
Faulty Systems with Hidden State
In this section I discuss the motivation behind runtime verification and elaborate on
its utility for complex embedded systems that include hardware and software. I also
introduce the need to handle stochastic systems and systems with hidden state. The
subsequent section sketches my approach to estimating safety for such systems, while
Section 1.3 discusses related work.
From Model Checking to Runtime Verification
Most complex software systems are deployed with bugs. The field of formal verification
strives to prove that software is correct through model checking, but the efficiency and
practicality of these methods are hindered by a problem of state explosion, also known
as the curse of dimensionality [4]. Though progress has been made and model checking
has proven to be a valuable tool for specific applications such as airline reservation
system software and space probe control software [4,8,12,25], these methods still do
not apply to a wide range of real world systems. In practice, extensive testing instead
is used to expose bugs. However, testing is never guaranteed to be exhaustive, and
many complex software systems are riddled with problems not caught at design time
that are addressed through frequent patches and service packs. Consequently, the
field of runtime verification [14] has emerged to check program correctness at runtime,
circumventing the combinatorial problem and thus providing complex systems with a
safety net for design time verification and testing.
Runtime verification complements testing methods by providing a framework for
automated testing that can be extended into a capability for monitoring a system
post-deployment. With a runtime verification capability in place, an operational
system can detect deviations from formally specified behavior and potentially take
corrective action. In this way, runtime verification complements testing methods and
provides a capability for fault-tolorance which is desirable for safety critical systems.
Formal Methods in Hardware Design and Operation
Formal verification techniques were developed for software systems, but the use of
these techniques as a part of hardware design has been advocated [33] and shown to
be feasible for electronic embedded systems such as logical circuits [5,9, 11]. Formal
verification of hardware design is suitable for small systems that can be modeled
precisely and who's inputs are known.
However, from a practical standpoint, complex hardware systems have operational
environments that may cause significant deviations from modeled behavior, rendering
formal verification of design ineffective. These systems can benefit from design
verification, but this does not prove that they will operate correctly when deployed.
Runtime verification has therefore extended formal verification of hardware systems
to deal with complex mixed systems, that is, systems that are a mix of hardware
and software [7,29]. Runtime verification of mixed systems provides a capability for
monitoring the behavior of a system in the field, with the potential for a corrective
functionality that acts based on the output of the monitor.
The Need for Hidden State
Runtime verification for mixed systems assumes observability of properties to be
monitored. This thesis argues that for complex hardware systems such as a space
probe or a car, the system's state is generally unobservable, due to the high cost of
sensing all variables reliably. Hence, in order to perform general runtime verification
of these mixed systems, this thesis extends proven runtime verification techniques so
that they handle systems with hidden states.
To deal with hidden states, I draw upon inference techniques from the field of
Model-based diagnosis (MBD) [15,41], which require an accurate model of the system
components and constraints. MBD applies conflict-directed search techniques in order
to quickly enumerate system configurations, such as failure modes, that are consistent
with the model and observations. These techniques are suitable for mixed systems
and scale well [26-28,40].
Dealing with Systems that Fail
A second issue, not directly addressed by runtime verification, is that complex systems
with long life cycles experience performance degradation due to seemingly random
hardware failure. Many systems function well when manufactured, but may become
unsafe over time, especially when they are in use for longer than their intended life span.
For example, car owners occasionally fail to have their vehicles inspected promptly,
which can result in a component, such as the braking system, receiving more use than
it was designed for. We want to be able to detect any breaches of safety due to wear
and tear in such a situation.
Thus, this thesis advocates the use of a plant model that incorporates stochastic
behavior [40], allowing wear and tear to be modeled as stochastic hardware failure.
With such a model, specification violations resulting from performance degradation
can be detected online and recovery action can be taken, such as the removal of unsafe
functions.
1.2 Architecture of the proposed solution
This thesis proposes a capability for the monitoring of formal specifications for mixed
systems that are written in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [30]. Linear Temporal Logic
is a well studied logic that is similar to plain English and expressive enough to capture
many important high-level safety requirements. Additionally, the requirements are
allowed to be written over hidden system states.
This safety monitoring capability will also have a model of the stochastic, faulty
plant captured as a Probabilistic Hierarchical Constraint Automaton (PHCA) [40].
This automaton representation allows for the abstract specification of embedded
software, as well as the specification of discrete hardware modes, including known
failure modes. Additionally, stochastic transitions may be specified in order to model
random hardware failure. Such a model of the system allows the safety monitoring
capability to identify hidden system state, including in the case of sensor failure,
unmodeled failures, intermittent failures, or multiple faults.
Given sensory information, the safety monitoring capability will then compute
online the likelihood that the LTL safety requirements are being met. This is accom-
plished by framing the problem as an instance of belief state update over the combined
physical/safety state of the system, as described in Chapter 4.
Together, the use of LTL and PHCA provide a clean specification method for
performing safety monitoring of mixed stochastic systems. Viewing safety monitoring
as belief state update on a hybrid of BA and PHCA state provides an elegant framing
of the problem as an instance Bayesian filtering.
1.3 Related Work
Next, consider the work presented in this thesis compared to recent prior art.
Some examples of the successful application of runtime verification techniques in
software systems are JPaX by Havelund and Rogu [19] and DBRover by Drusinsky [16],
both shown to be effective monitors for a planetary rover control program [8]. Another
approach given by Kim et al., MaC [23], has proven effective at monitoring formations
of flying vehicles [22]. This thesis builds on such work by extending these techniques
to deal with mixed stochastic systems.
Peters and Parnas [29] and Black [7] have suggested monitors for runtime verification
of systems including hardware, but these works do not consider hidden state, which
this thesis does.
Techniques have been developed for the model checking of systems that exhibit
probabilistic behavior [4,20,34,38]. While these methods are appropriate for random-
ized algorithms and have even been applied to biological systems [20], they are not
concerned with complex mixed systems, as these mixed systems operate in environ-
ments that may cause significant deviations from modeled behavior. Additionally, if a
mixed system is modeled having randomly occurring hardware failures, proving its
correctness becomes problematic because the model will fail by definition.
More recently, techniques have been demonstrated for the runtime verification
of systems that exhibit probabilistic behavior [32, 36]. Sistla and Srinivas present
randomized algorithms for the monitoring of liveness properties on simple software
systems given as hidden Markov models [36]. Their approach is subtly different from
the one presented in this thesis, as they focus on the probabilistic monitoring of
liveness properties. The properties they are concerned with are not written over
hidden states of the system, but instead over the observations that the system generates.
They employ counters and timeouts to probabilistically predict whether the system will
satisfy the liveness requirement. This thesis does not attempt to predict the satisfaction
of liveness requirements, because in doing so a monitor may reject system executions
that have not been proven to violate the requirements. Instead of attempting to
monitor liveness requirements, we would prefer to convert liveness properties into more
specific timed properties (see Chapter 5), making them more useful for specifying
the true requirements of the system. Unlike the approach presented in this thesis,
Sistla and Srinivas do not provide the capability to monitor safety properties that
are written over hidden system states, and thus their methods do not suffice for the
purpose of safety monitoring of mixed systems.
Sammapun et al. perform monitoring of quantitative safety properties for stochastic
systems that have periodic behaviors, such as soft real-time schedulers [32]. A
quantitative property says, for instance, that a bad thing e such as a missed deadline
must occur no more than n percent of the time. The authors statistically evaluate an
execution trace for conformance to the property by checking subsections of the trace
for occurrences of the proscribed event e, and counting the number of subsections
on which e occurs. If e occurs in five out of 100 subsections, for instance, then they
estimate that e occurred 5 percent of the time. In order to assert that a property has
been violated, their method must gain confidence in its estimation by evaluating a
sufficiently long history of program state. Therefore property violations that occur
early in the operation of the system will not be caught. Their approach for the
verification of quantitative properties is sound, but they do not monitor properties
written over hidden system states, which this thesis does. Additionally, their approach
is built on an assumption of periodic system behavior, which this thesis is not limited
by.
Runtime verification has been moving towards the monitoring of general properties
for mixed stochastic systems, but no work I know of has attempted to monitor
properties written over unobservable system states. Additionally, no work has employed
a system model appropriate for faulty hardware systems. This thesis provides these
novel capabilities.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 3 details an approach
to runtime verification for observable systems. Chapter 4 then solves the problem
formally outlined in Chapter 2 by extending runtime verification methods into the
realm of stochastic, partially-observable systems. Chapter 5 presents and discusses
empirical validation as well as future work.
Chapter 2
The Problem
2.1 Problem Statement
This thesis provides a capability for performing runtime safety monitoring of an
embedded system which will fail over its lifetime. This capability should assume that
the system is partially observable and behaves stochastically. In addition, the system
is implemented as a combination of hardware and software. In order to provide this
capability, this thesis solves the following problem:
Given a safety specification in Linear Temporal Logic, a model of the
physical system as a Probabilistic Hierarchical Constraint Automaton, and
an observation and command history for the system from time 0 to t, for
each time t return the probability that the safety specification is satisfied
up to t. This estimate is to be performed online.
2.2 Motivating the Problem
Consider a car as a complex, safety-critical embedded system. The quantity of
software onboard cars has increased dramatically over the past decade and is expected
to continue increasing exponentially [1]. A luxury vehicle today is shipped with roughly
100 million lines of control code encompassing everything from the powertrain and
brakes to onboard entertainment systems. This number is expected to increase to 200
or 300 million lines of code in the near future. The complexity inherent in so great
a magnitude of software raises concerns about the safety and reliability of modern
automobiles.
Consider specifically the SAFELANE system [2], a module designed to prevent
unintentional lane departures due to operator inattention or fatigue. When active, this
module detects accidental lane departures, and either warns the operator or actively
corrects the vehicle's trajectory. In order to perform course corrections, SAFELANE
must have the ability to steer the vehicle. Such a degree of control requires safety
measures, thus the design of SAFELANE should include every reasonable precaution
to avoid collisions, rollovers, and other dangerous control situations.
This type of semi-autonomous control of a vehicle, along with advanced longitudinal
controllers such as adaptive cruise control, has the potential to greatly improve
automobile safety and efficiency. Car manufacturers are slow to include these features
not because the technology does not exist, but because of the prohibitive liability
it represents. Cars are truly safety critical systems. Small design errors in such a
subsystem could have serious consequences, such as property damage or loss of human
life. These systems would be tested extensively, yet this provides no safety guarantees.
To supplement testing, this thesis proposes a capability for monitoring the safety
requirements of such an embedded system. With this capability, a system such as
a car can be monitored during operation, and violations of the formalized safety
requirements can be detected.
2.2.1 Description of the SAFELANE
Consider a model of SAFELANE contained within a simplified car, see Figure 2-1. This
car consists of a steering wheel, brake and gas pedal, SAFELANE, and a touchscreen
interface that a human operator may use to command SAFELANE (known as a
Human-Machine Interface or HMI). SAFELANE consists of a visual sensing system, a
decision function that calculates appropriate control actions, and actuation on steering,
brake and gas pedals. In addition to the main decision function of SAFELANE, a
redundant calculation occurs in parallel. This backup calculation is used as a sanity
check for the control system. SAFELANE can be overridden by certain driver actions,
like a steering action, and can be disabled by the human operator via the HMI. The
steering wheel, gas pedal, and brake pedal are all observable variables, as is the state
of the HMI and the visual sensing unit. The autonomous subsystem is able to request
control of brake, steering, and acceleration, and receive control based on results of an
arbitration between the driver inputs and all autonomous subsystem requests.
2.2.2 An Example Safety Requirement
For a system to behave in a 'safe' manner, it must not endanger the operator through
any action or lack of action. In cases where it would be unsafe to act, for instance, if
the system cannot determine the correct control action, then the system is excused
from its obligation to act.
This is a general description of safety in any system. For a specified system, we
can specialize and formalize this description. The main safety requirement of the
SAFELANE system is that the system must take appropriate corrective action if it
detects an imminent lane departure. Restated:
If ever the visual sensing system determines that the vehicle is experiencing
a lane departure, SAFELANE must request a control action appropriate
to the situation, or issue a warning signal.
To formalize this requirement, we write it in a logic known as Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL). This logic is described in Section 3.2. The formalized version of the
above requirement is:
EI(VISUALSENSING=imminent-departure
SAFELANE= Requesting Control V SAFELANE=Warning Signal)
This is read as "For all time, if visual sensing detects an imminent departure, then
SAFELANE is requesting control or signaling a warning." This requirement specifies
the correct functionality of SAFELANE.
2.2.3 A PHCA Plant Model
Figure 2-1: The SAFELANE autonomous subsystem and its subcomponents. The
system is also comprised of a visual sensing unit that is observable, and actuation
units. The system's purpose is to prevent unintentional lane departures.
In order to estimate the current state of the system, our capability requires a model
of system behavior. Because the system consists of both hardware and software, the
model is of both hardware and software behavior. In Figure 2-1, I show a model of the
SAFELANE system as a Probabilistic Hierarchical Constraint Automaton. This type
of automaton, detailed in Section 4.3, captures the discrete modes of system operation
as sublocations. Transitions may occur probabilistically, component automata may
contain sub-automata, and locations within the automata may be constrained by
values of system variables or by the operational mode of other components.
In this model, the SAFELANE component may be ON or OFF, and may transition
between these modes based on the primitive command from the user of KEY-ON()
............... .....: ....... ........--- .
or KEY-OFF(. Within the ON mode, the component may be Disabled, Enabled, or
there may be a Fault Detected. The user may toggle between Disabled and Enabled
with the HMI (Human-Machine Interface), represented by the primitive methods
HMI-ENABLEO and HMI-DISABLE(. If SAFELANE is Disabled, it is Idle if the
visual sensing unit determines that the vehicle is safely IN LANE, and will transition
into a state where it issues a warning signal if the visual sensing system detects a
potential lane departure. Similarly, within the Enabled mode, the system transitions
from Idle to Requesting Control if the visual system senses a potential lane departure.
Within this mode, SAFELANE may request different types of control actions. These
choices are constrained by A, B, and C, which are results of the decision function.
When control is granted to SAFELANE, it is in the Correcting mode. If ever the result
of the decision function does not match the result of the backup calculation, then the
system enters the Fault Detected mode. At all times the model may transition into
the Unknown mode with a small probability.
The visual sensing system has the following modes, which are observable:
1. Lanes Not Sensible - LNS
2. In Lane - IL
3. Imminent Departure - ID
4. Intentional Lane Departure - ILD
5. Unintentional Lane Departure - ULD
Other observable variables include whether or not SAFELANE is requesting control
of the vehicle (Requesting Control or RQC), and whether or not SAFELANE's control
request has been granted (CONTROL-REQUEST-GRANTED or CRG).
Example Execution Trace of Capability
Recall the problem statement from Section 2.1:
Given a safety specification in Linear Temporal Logic, a model of the
physical system as a Probabilistic Hierarchical Constraint Automaton, and
an observation (z) and command (c) history for the system from time 0
to t, for each time t return the probability that the safety specification is
satisfied up to t. This estimate is to be performed online.
Earlier in this section an example safety specification for the SAFELANE system
in LTL was presented, as well as a PHCA model of the system, completing the
information that the proposed capability requires before runtime.
At runtime, the capability takes in a command and observation history. For
example:
t 1 2 3 4 5
ci:t KEY-ON() o HMI-ENABLE() O O
Z1:t LNS IL ILD IL (ULD,RQC)
With these inputs, this capability will calculate that the probability of the system
meeting its safety requirement as follows:
t 1 2 3 4 5
P(SAFE) 1 1 1 1 1
If, however, the observation at time five does not include RQC:
Z5 = {ULD}
Then the capability will calculate P(SAFE) at t = 5 to be 0.
2.3 Motivating the Approach
In this section I present two examples of safety requirements to motivate the assump-
tions behind the approach taken. Those assumptions are that the plant state is hidden,
and that the plant hardware may fail stochastically. The first example demonstrates
the utility of runtime verification for a system such as SAFELANE when the safety
state can be directly observed. The second example illustrates the need to relax
the assumption of full system observability for hardware systems, and then further
demonstrates the utility of allowing a stochastic plant model.
2.3.1 A Directly Monitorable Safety Requirement
For the SAFELANE example system in Figure 2-1, one important safety measure
that can be enforced is to revoke SAFELANE's control privileges when it appears to
be making a faulty calculation. If a fault is detected in the decision function (that
is, if the main and redundant control computations do not agree), then we require
that SAFELANE not be allowed to control the vehicle until it has been power cycled.
Restated:
If ever the result of the control calculation of the decision function does
not agree with the backup calculation, from that time on the subsystem
shall never receive control of the vehicle.1
This is a relatively conservative requirement, which assumes that a faulty computation
may have been caused by a component outside the decision function, and thus will not
be fixed by simply resetting SAFELANE. This requirement is revisited in Sections 3.2
and 3.3, see Equation (3.2).
The problem statement above assumes we are given the history of observations
and control actions. As this safety requirement is written solely over the observable
variables REQUEST-X, BACKUP-CALCULATION, and CONTROL-REQUEST-GRANTED, it
is possible to check whether the given history logically satisfies the formal statement
of the safety requirement. In fact, this is exactly what the field of runtime verification
does.
In runtime verification, a safety monitor checks at each time step to see if the
formal specification is being satisfied by the system. For example, assume that the
following observations are received from the SAFELANE system:
t 1 ... n
z SAFELANE-REQUEST-BRAKE=T, ... CONTROL-REQUEST-GRANTED= T
BACKUP-CALC-REQ-BRAKE F
At time t = 1, a fault is observed, and so SAFELANE enters the fault-detected
mode. However, this does not violate the safety requirement, so the safety monitor
'This statement assumes the monitor resets when the car is restarted.
returns a 1, indicating that the system is SAFE. At time t = n, control is granted to a
faulty SAFELANE, hence the safety monitor calculates that the requirement is being
violated and returns a 0.
2.3.2 A Hidden-State Safety Requirement
As was shown in the previous example, given requirements written over observable
and control variables, runtime verification is sufficient to provide a safety monitoring
capability. However, runtime verification does not currently address the problem of
incomplete sensing that is generally associated with hardware. Take, for example, the
following safety requirement:
If ever the brake, gas, or steering actuation fails, from that time on the
subsystem shall never receive control of the vehicle.
The requirement says that if any of the steering, brake, or gas pedal actuation
mechanisms fail, then SAFELANE should never receive control of any of them. This
will prevent the system from asserting control during situations that its controller was
not designed for.
Assume the safety monitor has access to the steering wheel encoder data, and to
the commands sent by SAFELANE to the steering actuator. Consider the scenario
in which SAFELANE commands the steering wheel to turn, and at the next time
step the encoder reports that the wheel has not turned. It seems clear that some
component of the system is not behaving correctly, but it is unclear whether the
actuator is at fault or the encoder.
In this example scenario the state of the actuator is hidden. Put another way, the
safety monitor cannot directly observe whether the actuator is failed or not. This
means that the safety requirement above is written over hidden states. Thus, the
runtime verification approach employed in the previous example will no longer suffice.
Instead, the safety monitor must be able to infer the values of these hidden variables.
To accomplish what the runtime verification approach could not, I introduce
inference techniques from the field of model-based diagnosis [15]. Intuitively, having a
model of system behavior provides a basis for reasoning over hidden system states.
For example, in the scenario described above, the model of correct actuator and
encoder behavior dictates that the encoder output mirror the actuator input. An
input of a "turn" command to the actuator and an output of "no turn occurred"
from the encoder are therefore inconsistent with the model of nominal behavior.
Thus the possible system configurations must include either ACTUATOR= failed or
ENCODER=failed. This type of model-based reasoning allows the safety monitoring
capability to identify system configurations that are consistent with the observed
information, and therefore address the problem of incomplete sensing associated with
hardware. The runtime verification approach described in the preceding example has
no faculty for reasoning over hidden states.
2.3.3 A Safety Requirement for a Stochastic Plant
Consider again the previous requirement:
If ever the brake, gas, or steering actuation fails, from that time on the
subsystem shall never receive control of the vehicle.
When a system includes a hidden system state, such as the operational mode of the
actuator, the observable information may allow for multiple consistent diagnoses. In
addition to inferring the set of possible system states, it is desirable to be able to infer
their relative likelihoods. If the system model is allowed to include stochastic behavior,
knowledge of the likelihood of random hardware failure can be encoded as a stochastic
transition to a failure mode. In this way, the safety monitor has information about the
relative likelihood of failure based on the relative magnitudes of modeled stochastic
transitions. Thus it is possible to infer a probability distribution over all possible
values of system state. This allows the safety nionitor to calculate a probability that
the safety requirement is satisfied. The inference of this probability is described in
Section 4.2.
2.4 Discussion
This chapter has given three examples of safety requirements that can be monitored
for the example system, SAFELANE. These examples were used to highlight a series
of behaviors that a safety monitoring system should embody. In particular, in order
to monitor these requirements, a capability is required that augments traditional
runtime verification by handling systems which have a hidden state and may fail
stochastically. The problem then becomes that of estimating the probability that
the safety requirements are being satisfied, given observations and commands. This
problem can be solved using tools from model-based diagnosis in order to reason
probabilistically over hidden system states.
Chapter 3 describes the traditional runtime verification approach. This approach
allows for the monitoring of requirements written over observable system variables.
Chapter 4 augments the runtime verification approach with inference techniques
enabling the monitoring of safety requirements that are written over hidden states.
Chapter 3
Calculating System Safety:
Runtime Verification for
Observable Systems
x Plant (physical) state A Formal safety specification
z Observations q Safety state
c Commands a An LTL statement
xt x at time t W A word legible to a Bilchi Automaton
Zi: short for {zi, z2 ,. . . , zt} T the Boolean truth value
Recall that the specific problem solved by this thesis is that of taking a formal spec-
ification A of desired system behavior in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), a description
<P of the behavior of the system as a Probabilistic Hierarchical Constraint Automaton
(PHCA), as well as a series of commands c to and observations z from the system,
and then returning a probability that the system is consistent with A. I will perform
this calculation under the assumption that the system may behave stochastically and
has hidden states.
In this chapter I revisit the solution to the problem of runtime verification of a
system in which we assume full observability and deterministic behavior. In Chapter
4, I extend the runtime verification approach to an exact algorithm handling mixed
hardware/software systems by dealing with hidden-state and stochasticity.
Within this chapter I present the runtime monitoring approach in Section 3.1. I
then give an in depth introduction to Linear Temporal Logic in Section 3.2, then
Biichi Automata (BA), a representative state machine format for LTL, in Section 3.3.
I discuss the conversion from LTL to BA in Section 3.4.
3.1 Runtime Verification
The field of runtime verification [14] arose from the desire to check the correctness of
complex programs without needing to check every possible execution of the software.
This is in contrast to model checking methods [4,13], where a mathematical model of
the system is checked against a formal specification in order to prove correctness before
a system is deployed. Model checking only proves that the given model of the program
meets the specification, as opposed to proving that the implementation is correct, and
is therefore only as good as the model. Additionally, model checking can also only
check those properties that do not depend on environmental input, as these inputs are
not known completely at design time. Lastly, these methods suffer from a problem of
state explosion related to the need to check every possible execution. There are serious
problems involved with enumerating all possible executions explicitly or symbolically,
and many of these executions are quite unlikely. Therefore runtime verification only
checks one relevant execution, that is, the one that actually occurs. Because this
execution is generated by the running system, verifying its correctness verifies that the
system is behaving correctly, not just the model. Additionally, properties dependent
on the environment may also be checked.
The goal of runtime verification is to determine, at every time step, if the system is
currently meeting its correctness requirement A. This description of system correctness
A is a set of formally specified, high-level and time-evolved behaviors that have been
determined to be necessary for safe system operation. Under the assumptions that
the system is fully observable and behaves deterministically, we can accomplish this
using the tools I present later in the chapter.
Section 3.2 describes Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), a logic that is suitable for
formally specifying the correct behavior of a reactive system; with this logic we can
write A. Section 3.3 then presents an automaton format that is equivalent to LTL, the
Biichi Automaton (BA). A Linear Temporal Logic statement is compiled into a Biichi
Automaton using the method presented in Section 3.4. When a Biichi Automaton
for an LTL statement A is run on a program execution trace, it will reject if A is
violated by the trace, and it will accept if the requirement is satisfied thus far by the
trace. Therefore, using the tools presented later in this chapter, we are able verify at
runtime that a system is behaving correctly.
3.2 Linear Temporal Logic
In this section I informally and formally describe Linear Temporal Logic [3,30] as well
as give some examples of important temporal properties that can be stated in LTL.
Temporal or tense logics were created in part by researchers wishing to ensure
program correctness [30]. These logics were and are used to describe correctness
criteria for computer programs, such as in [25]. It was shown that Linear Temporal
Logic is as expressive as first order logic [21]. This fact, combined with LTL's similarity
to natural language, makes it a powerful yet concise and straightforward language for
representing desired operating criteria.
LTL extends standard Boolean logic to include the notion of time. The truth of
the propositions comprising an LTL statement A may vary over time. A set of truth
assignments to all propositions of A, for all time, is called a word V, and is said to
have infinite length. For example, if A is written over the proposition a, then is is
possible for a to be true at every time step, which we write:
WO = a a a...
If W is such that the truth assignments to the propositions across time satisfy A,
then that word is said to be in the language of A. Hence the language of A is the
set of infinite-length words that satisfy the statement. For example, the language of
A0 = Wa, which requires that a be true for all time, is exactly Wo. If A is a statement
of system correctness, then the language of A represents all possible correct system
executions.
However, in runtime verification, we can never observe an infinite sequence of
system states, only a finite prefix W of that infinite execution W. The task of runtime
verification is then to determine whether or not the finite word W is in the language
of A. Without the infinite execution trace, this is not necessarily decidable. The
definition of LTL presented in this thesis is based on those provided by the recent
runtime verification literature [6,18], which take into account our desire to decide the
membership of the finite word W in the language of A.
3.2.1 An Informal Description of LTL
LTL augments standard Boolean logic with temporal operators, and hence is comprised
of temporal and non-temporal (which can be thought of as spatial) operators. Boolean
operators describe relationships between the truth of propositions at a single point in
time. For instance, the formula a V #3 says that currently, either a is true, or 3 is true.
If a and 13 are propositions, then one way to satisfy this formula is:
a= T
The other Boolean operators are included in LTL as well, such as conjunction (A),
negation (,), and implication (- ).
Temporal operators describe relationships between propositions that span time.
One example is the temporal operator "eventually" (F, for future, or 0), which requires
that at some time now or in the future its argument must be true. For instance,
the formula Oa (read: "eventually alpha") can be satisfied thusly, where the ellipses
indicate that the intervening values are similar to what precedes them, and the dash
indicates that the value of the variable does not matter:
t=1 2 3 ... n n+1
a=F a=F a=F ... a=T -
The dual of F is "always" (G or D), which says that a proposition must be true for
all time, or globally. So to satisfy Fa, only this will do:
t =0 1 ... n ... tend
a=-T a=T ... a=T ... a=T
Intuitively, G is the dual of F because if a must always be false, then it is never the
case that it is eventually true:
--,a = ,Oa
The third temporal operator we consider is "until" (plain U or U). It is a binary
operator that says that its first argument must hold until the second is true, and the
second must eventually happen. The following values satisfy aup3 (read: "alpha until
beta"):
t=1 2 ... n n+
a=T a=T a=T a=F -
3=F O=F ... /3=T -
The O operator can be written in terms of U, as well. For example, Ooa may also be
written:
TUa
The dual of U is "release" or R (sometimes written V). aR# says that a becoming
true releases 13 from its obligation to be true at the next time step. This operator
does not require that a eventually be true, in contrast to the U operator. Thus, there
are two general ways for a R formula, such as aR,3, to be satisfied:
t=1 2 ... n n+1
a=F a=F ... a=T -
1
O=T O=T O=T #=T -
a=F a=F ... a=F ...
2
O=T O=T O=T #=T O=T
The first way is similar to U, with the difference that 3 must be true up to and at
the same time as the first time that a holds (at time n). After t = n, the formula is
satisfied and the values of neither matter. The second way for the example release
formula to be satisfied is simply for # to always be true.
The final temporal operator we introduce is called "next" (X or 0). This operator
is different from the other temporal operators because it describes what must happen
at the next time step, and doesn't constrain any other time steps. If Oa holds at
t = 1, then the following satisfies the property:
t=1 2
- az=T -
This type of property can be useful, but also introduces ambiguity into the
specification if the amount of real time between t = 1 and t = 2 is left unspecified. For
example, asserting the property TURN-KEY -+ OCAR-ON does not specify whether
the car should be ON one second or one hour from when then key is turned. In other
words, it is unclear what system behavior will satisfy this formula. Additionally, as
noted by [18], this operator is problematic for finite execution traces because the
meaning of Oa at the last state in the trace is undefined. Thus, in order to avoid the
ambiguity Q causes, we do not allow it to appear explicitly in the safety specification
A. However, Q is an essential concept, and we still use the notion when compiling
LTL statements into Biichi Automata.
3.2.2 Examples
In the temporal logic literature, safety properties are defined as those which say that
some "bad" thing must never occur [3]. Pure safety properties can be expressed by
using the always (0) operator. A simple safety property for your life might be:
EI(-,CAR-ACCIDENT)
Equivalently, we can say that something "good" must constantly be occurring. A
simple yet essential safety property for a graduate student is:
L (POSITIVE-THESIS-PROGRESS)
A different type of property is a liveness property, which says that some "good"
thing must eventually happen. In a software system, important liveness properties
might include termination, that is, that a program will eventually return control:
O (PROGRAM-RETURNS)
or responsiveness, that is, that a program will eventually respond when a request is
made:
F- (RECEIVE-REQUEST - (RESPOND-TO-REQUEST))
These types of statements can never be definitively violated, though they can be
completely satisfied at some point. In other words, there is always hope that the
required "good thing" may still happen. For a graduate student, the all-important
liveness statement is:
A1 = O(GRADUATE) (3.1)
Alpern and Schneider [3] formally define safety and liveness, and show that the set
of all properties expressible by LTL is the union of all safety and all liveness properties.
For the SAFELANE example system presented in Chapter 2, we can describe some
important high-level desired properties in LTL. The example given in Section 2.3.1
was that we might wish an autonomous subsystem of an automobile to be denied
control of the vehicle if an error is detected in its calculations:
A2 = E(FAULT-MONITOR= T -- E(CONTROL-REQUEST-GRANTED= F)) (3.2)
For the same autonomous subsystem, we may require that the subsystem not command
an acceleration for a vehicle that has stopped unless the driver releases the brake,
depresses the gas pedal, or enables the system through the human-machine interface
(HMI):
D(VEHICLE-HALTS=T -
(BRAKE =F V GAS-PEDAL = T V HMI-ENABLE = T) R CONTROL-GRANTED = F)
These final two examples due in part to Black [7].
3.2.3 LTL Formal Definition
If p is a proposition (a statement that evaluates to T or F), then a well formed LTL
statement a is outlined by the the following grammar:
a=T
|p
|-,a
|a A a
aula
I also use the following standard abbreviations for LTL statements a and 13:
a V 1 -3(,a A ,#)
a -~ # -,a V /3
Oa T Ma
EWa
Say W is a finite word over time consisting of the individual letters (o-io-20- 3 . .. -n),
where each ot represents an assignment to a set of propositions E at time t. Then the
original LTL operators are formally defined as follows, where W b= a means that a is
entailed by W:
W = p iff p E o-1
W -,a iff W a
WkbaA
W b aUS
iff Wkb a and Wkb3
iff 3k s.t. U-..-' b- #and
1-..-k-1 = a
This specifies that a word W satisfies a proposition p if the first letter of W satisfies
p. Restated, W satisfies p if p is in the set of propositions that hold at time t = 1. A
negated formula holds if its positive form does not hold. A conjunction holds if both
arguments hold individually. Lastly, a formula involving the until operator (a U3) is
entailed by W if there is some partition of W into U1.._1Uk and Uk..an, such that a is
entailed by the first substring (l..Uk_1), and #3 is entailed by second (gk..Un).
3.2.4 LTL Summary
In this section I introduced Linear Temporal Logic informally and formally, and gave
some examples of different classes of properties expressible by LTL, as well as some
examples of properties that are relevant to the SAFELANE example system, presented
in Chapter 2. LTL is a simple yet expressive language that allows us to write formal
specifications of correct behavior for complex embedded systems. Next we explore an
executable form of LTL, which we use to monitor LTL statements at runtime.
3.3 B ichi Automata
Nondeterministic Blichi Automata (BA) extend nondeterministic finite automata
(NFA) [35] to operate on infinite-length words, allowing us to use a Biichi Automaton
to represent the language of a Linear Temporal Logic statement [4,39). This provides us
with an executable form of an LTL statement. With a BA we can perform monitoring
of its corresponding LTL statement on some input. Recall that we are only interested
in finite-length state trajectories, as no infinite execution can be observed. Therefore
we will modify the accepting conditions of a canonical BA [10] to better represent our
interests. In this section I define the modified BA and give an example.
3.3.1 BA Formal Definition
A Nondeterministic Bichi Automaton is a tuple (Q, Qo, F, E, T) such that:
1The set of properties expressible by Nondeterministic Bichi Automata is not the same as the set
expressible by Deterministic Bichi Automata. Specifically, the full set of w-regular languages is not
expressible by the latter. In this chapter we work with Nondeterministic Buchi Automata, which I
abbreviate as simply "BA," as is common.
Q
Qo Q
F C Q
E
T: Q x E -+ 2Q
Finite set of states
Set of start states
Set of accepting states
Input alphabet
Transition function
The states Q of a BA can be thought of as representing abstract safety states of the
underlying physical system. 2 A BA is a tool for tracking the progress of the system
through these meta-states. For instance, recall the example LTL statement, Equation
(3.1) given in Section 3.2.2:
A1 = O(GRADUATE)
This example liveness requirement is modeled with two safety states: GRADUATED and
HAVE-NOT-GRADUATED. Consequently, the BA corresponding to A1 has two states:
BAA1 (Q) = {q,, q} {GRADUATED, HAVE-NOT-GRADUATED}
The underlying physical system may have very complicated dynamics involving funding
and advising situation, class schedule, red tape, writer's block, et cetera, but the BA
does not represent these dynamics, only the safety state of the system.
Start States
The start or initial states Qo are the states that are marked before the automaton
begins execution. They represent the initial safety state of the system. The automaton
must have at least one start state. The BA for A 1 starts in the HAVE-NOT-GRADUATED
state:
BAA1 (Qo) = {qh}
2This thesis refers to the states of the BA as safety states, whether or not the BA is constructed
to monitor a safety property as defined in Section 3.2.2.
States
Accepting States
The accepting states F represent safety states in which the LTL specifications corre-
sponding to the BA are being satisfied. The example A1 is satisfied upon graduation,
and not before. As soon as this liveness requirement is met once, it is satisfied
permanently. Therefore, the GRADUATED state is the single accepting state for this
example:
BAA1 (F) = {qg}
Alphabet
The alphabet E of a BA is the set of symbols that it may read in to advance the
safety state. Because the safety state of the system depends on the progression of the
system's physical configurations, E will consist of all possible physical configurations.
We assume each configuration, or physical state, can be fully represented by a unique
set of literals. Returning to the example safety requirement A1 , we can represent one
configuration of the underlying physical system with the set of literals:
(eg = ITHESIS-COMPLETED, CLASS-REQUIREMENTS-SATISFIED,... }
where Ueg c E.
The size of the alphabet depends on the number of unique underlying system
configurations and is generally exponential in the number of system components.
Transition Function
The transition function T defines the transitions that are enabled from a certain state
by a certain letter in the alphabet. In nondeterministic automata, many transitions
may be enabled at once, or no transitions may be. Hence the resulting value of T is
in the power set of Q.
In the graduation example above, perhaps the transition between states qh =
HAVE-NOT-GRADUATED and qg = GRADUATED is enabled by the following letter of
o-g = {THESIS-COMPLETED,
CLASS-REQUIREMENTS-SATISFIED,
ADVISOR-SIGNATURE}
Written another way, the transition function contains the entry:
T(qh,O-g) 
- {qg}
3.3.2 Operation of BA
Biichi Automata operate in almost the same way that simple finite-state machines do;
they receive inputs one at a time, advance the currently marked states according to
their transition function T, and then either accept or reject at the end of the input.
In nondeterministic automata, more than one state may be marked at once and more
than one transition may be taken at each time step. Additionally, we allow unguarded
transitions, called 6-transitions in Sipser's text [35]. We denote these as transitions
that are guarded by T.
Accepting condition
In contrast to nondeterministic finite automata, instead of determining acceptance by
the set of marked states at the end of the run, canonical BA accept if at least one
accepting state (one of F) is visited infinitely often during the run. However, since we
are considering only finite runs over the BA in this thesis, corresponding to the finite
state sequence generated by an embedded system, we alter the stopping condition
of a canonical BA. Therefore we say that we accept permanently if all eventualities
(liveness conditions) are satisfied and there are no safety conditions. We say that we
are are accepting at a time when all safety conditions are being met, and we say that
we reject if any safety condition is ever violated. Bauer et al. [6] define a three-valued
LTL for this purpose. 3 Hence, our accepting states will be states that represent (1) the
satisfaction of eventualities, or (2) the perpetual fulfillment of a safety requirement.
3 The three values are {T, F, ?}, which the authors jocularly call the good, the bad, and the ugly.
Algorithm 1: BA-RUN
Algorithm 1 gives the formal description of running a Bhichi Automaton.
Algorithm 1 BA-RUN
1: procedure BA-RUN(WiW 2. ..w, Qo, T, F)
2: Q'-Qo. > Initialize the set of marked states.
3: for each time t = 1..n do
4: Q ={}
5: for marked states q c QmI1 do
6: Q = Qm U T(q, wt)
7: end for
8: if Qn = 0 then > No transitions were enabled.
9: reject
10: else if 3q st q C (Qmfl F f T(q, T)) then > An accepting state with an
E self-transition is marked.
11: accept
12: end if
13: end for
14: if Q" m) F= 0 then > No accepting state is marked.
15: reject
16: else
17: accept
18: end if
19: end procedure
Initially, the set of states in Qo is marked (line 2). The algorithm then loops for
each input letter wt. The set of currently marked states Q"' is created in line 4. For
each previously marked state q, any states reachable from q with the input letter wt
are added to the set of currently marked states (line 6). If the algorithm finds in line
8 that no transitions were enabled by wt, then it rejects. This corresponds to a safety
requirement being violated at time t. On the other hand, if it finds in line 10 that one
of the currently marked states is an accepting state with a self-loop guarded by T,
then it accepts. This corresponds to the satisfaction of all eventualities (i.e. liveness
conditions that are described in Section 3.2.2).
Every time the end of the time loop (line 13) is reached without rejecting or
accepting, the automaton is accepting, but continues operating. This corresponds to
the indeterminate case in which membership of the input word in the language of
the automaton has not yet been proved or disproved. In this case, the system has
satisfied all safety requirements up to this point, but has not yet fulfilled all liveness
requirements. The automaton therefore accepts based on the fact that the system
is safe thus far, and then continue operating in order to continue monitoring the
requirements and in hopes that the liveness requirements will be met.
After all inputs have been read, the algorithm checks to see if any accepting
states are marked (line 14). If no accepting state is marked, then it rejects in line 15.
This corresponds to the failure of the system to satisfy a liveness condition. On the
other hand, if an accepting state is marked, then it accepts. In this case, all safety
requirements were met at all times, and so at the end of the system execution, the
system is deemed safe.
An Example of BA Execution: Monitoring a Safety Property
Consider again the example specification, Equation (3.2), given in Section 3.2.2:
A2 = D(FAULT-MONITOR= T --+ O(CONTROL-REQUEST-GRANTED = F))
The corresponding Blichi Automaton for A2 is shown in Figure 3-1.
-FM
-CRG
,CRG
Figure 3-1: The Biichi Automaton for a safety requirement of the SAFELANE example
system.
In Figure 3-1, the arrow coming from nowhere on the left indicates that state qi is
the start state of the automaton. State qi has a self transition that is guarded by the
requirement that FAULT-MONITOR=F, shortened to -,FM. Similarly, the transition
from state qi to q2 is guarded by CONTROL-REQUEST-GRANTED = F, as is the self
transition on state q2 . Accepting states are denoted with a double circle. In this
example, both states are accepting states.
Formally, the automaton is:
Q = {q, q2)
O ={qi} {qi} for qi, o-3
F {qi, q2} {q, q2} for qi, u4
{FMACRG =i, T = q2} for q1, ~2
FMA-CRG =U2 {q2} for q2 , 9 2 ,4
-FMACRG = U 3 , 0 otherwise
-FMA-CRG 
- U4 )
In the alphabet (E) specification, I introduce abbreviated names for each element
of the set, for example, o-1 for element FM A CRG.
To demonstrate the operation of the automaton, consider the input word:
t=1 2 3 4 5
W2 -FM -FM -FM FM -,FM
CRG -CRG CRG -CRG CRG
which could also be written:
W2 = -3040-3-20-
Next we examine BA-RUN(W 2).
0. Initialization (t = 0) The first step of execution creates the initial set of marked
states, equal to the set of initial states. At the end of this step, the initial state is
marked. State marking can be thought of either graphically - state qi is occupied - or
in terms of the set of marked states, Q7. In the automata depicted below, transitions
taken at the current time step are bold, and the resulting marked states are blue.
-FM
-CRGQg=-{qi} ,CRG
1. First Iteration (t = 1, input -3 = -FM A CRG) For each marked state, the
algorithm attempts to advance the automaton. The automaton has one marked state,
qi, and the input letter 9 3 = -,FMACRG will enable one transition, the self loop on qi.
In other words, the transition function T outputs qi for inputs {qi, o-}.
-FM
-,CRG
,-CRG 'lQ'l + q1 = T (q1,9o3)
For the physical system, this means that no fault was observed in the autonomous
subsystem and a control request was granted at this time step. Because this time
step ends with accept states marked, the system is currently satisfying the safety
requirement and therefore the automaton is accepting. This result makes sense because
the requirement is that the subsystem never have control if a fault is ever observed.
2. Second Iteration (t = 2, input cx4 = -,FM A -,CRG) At this time step, both
possible transitions are enabled, and the automaton is now in both states at once. No
fault has been observed, hence the automaton is accepting still.
-FM
,t CRGQj <- {qi, q2} = T(qi,o 4 )
-CRG
U
3. Third Iteration
the self transition on
the safety property is
(t = 3, input = -,FM A CRG) This input letter (o-3) enables
q1 , but no others. Again, the automaton is accepting because
being satisfied.
{qi} .T,3 ) + T(q2, o3 )
-FM
-,CRG
qCRGQ
4. Fourth Iteration (t = 4, input = FM A -CRG) For the fourth input letter o-2 ,
the sole transition enabled is the one from qi to q2 -
-FM
-,CRG
Q <- q2 = T(q1, 0~2 ) ,-CRG
For the physical system, this means that a fault was observed in the autonomous
subsystem, but that no control request was granted to it. Requirement (3.2) has not
yet been violated, and so the automaton is accepting. However, the only way to satisfy
Equation (3.2) at this point is to never grant a control request to the autonomous
subsystem (D-CRG).
5. Final Iteration (t = 5, input = -,FMACRG) For the final letter, U-3 again, no
transitions are enabled.
" <-0 = T(q2 , U3 )
The automaton now has no marked states, therefore the safety requirement has been
irrevocably violated. The automaton now rejects immediately.
Another Example of BA Execution: Monitoring a Liveness Property
Now consider the example liveness property (3.1) from Section 3.2.2:
A1 =O(GRADUATE)
Section 3.3.1 describes the formal structure of the corresponding BA, represented in
Figure 3-2.
T
T
q a
Figure 3-2: The BA for an example liveness property.
The automaton starts in qh, the state HAVE-NOT-GRADUATED. When the letter
oq is read, the automaton transitions to state qg, GRADUATED. Recall that Ug- is the
system configuration:
o-7 {THESIS-COMPLETED,
CLASS-REQUIREMENTS-SATISFIED,
ADVISOR-SIGNATUREI
Another letter in the alphabet of this automaton is ac = CLASS-REQS-SATISFIED,
representing the configuration in which class requirements have been satisfied, but
neither THESIS-COMPLETED nor ADVISOR-SIGNATURE is true. Consider the operation
of this automaton on W1 - o-cocogug. The automaton begins in qh:
T
99
Q = {qh}
The first two input letters, both o-, only enable the self-transition on qh:
T
T
The automaton "waits" in qh for the liveness requirement to be satisfied. As long as
monitoring is still occurring, there is hope that the property will be satisfied, and so
the automaton is accepting, even though no accepting states are marked.
The third input letter, og, enables the transition from qh to qg:
T
QMf <- q= -T(qh,o-g) qhg
At this point, an accepting state with a TRUE self-transition is marked, so the
automaton accepts permanently per line 10 of Algorithm 1. Even though the system
Q2 - qh = T(qh, o-c)
continues running, there is sufficient information to prove the membership of W1 in
A1.
3.3.3 BA Summary
In this section I introduced the Nondeterministic Biichi Automaton, a state machine
format that operates on infinite words. We saw that this is relevant to the runtime
verification of stochastic systems in that it allows us to monitor a formal requirement
written in LTL. I also presented an example of this monitoring. In the next section I
discuss how BA are obtained given an LTL statement.
3.4 LTL to BA conversion
In order to automate the monitoring of a Linear Temporal Logic statement A, we
convert it to a Blchi Automaton and execute it, as discussed above in Section 3.3.
For example, LTL conversion maps the statement:
A2 = E(FAULT-MONITOR= T -- > EI(CONTROL-REQUEST-GRANTED = F)) (3.3)
into the following automaton:
-FM
-CRG
q, -CRG q
Figure 3-3: The Bichi Automaton for a safety requirement of the SAFELANE example
system. This automaton is described in detail in Section 3.3.2.
To perform this conversion, I use the method specific to BA on finite inputs
described by Giannakopoulou and Havelund in [18], which is based on earlier work
[13,17,42] on converting LTL to a form of BA for the purposes of model checking. I
do not prove the correctness of this algorithm, for this the reader is referred to [18].
Transition
State
Source Guard
q0  0
q0 -FM
qi -FM
q0 -CRG
qi -CRG
q2 q2  -CRGA-,FM
q2 -CRG
Table 3.1: This table depicts the result of compilation of Equation (3.3) into a Blichi
Automaton. There are three states. Every line in the entry for a state represents
a transition into that state, from the indicated state, guarded by the Guard. An
equivalent automaton is shown in Figure 3-3.
However, it can be seen intuitively that this compilation maps each element of an LTL
formula into an equivalent BA. Compilation will result specifically in a set of states,
each with a list of transitions that lead to it. In the example given above, compilation
produces the states shown in Table 3.1. Each line in the table represents a transition
that is from the "Source" location, to the "State" location, and is guarded by the
given "Guard".
In the following sections I describe an algorithm for generating a BA that is usable
for monitoring an input formula A. This is done through repeated decomposition of A,
described below. I also briefly discuss a post-processing step that may be performed
in order to compactly encode the list of states; this results in an automata like the
one shown in Figure 3-3. Section 3.4.2 presents the psuedo code for this compilation
process. Section 3.4.3 provides a detailed example of compilation.
3.4.1 An Informal Description of Compilation
For monitoring purposes, it is not acceptable to have the following as an automaton
for Property (3.3):
D(FM -* LICRG)
go q
While this automaton is technically correct, it is not useful because it requires that
the complete program trace be available at once in order to verify that the guard
is satisfied. In contrast, the automaton in Figure 3-3 is able tell at each time step
whether or not the property is currently being satisfied. Hence this automaton may
be used to track the safety state of the system, as was shown in Section 3.3.2.
The key insight here is that the two safety states of the automaton in Figure 3-3
represent the two different system behaviors that satisfy Property 3.3. Safety state
qi represents the scenario in which a fault has not been detected. If no fault is ever
detected ([-FM), then the automaton is always in state qi and the property is satisfied.
State q2 represents the scenario in which a fault has been detected, but control has
not been granted. If control is never granted (1-CRG), then the automaton is always
in state q2 and the property is satisfied. The goal of compilation is to identify these
distinct behaviors that satisfy the input formula A and record these behaviors as
separate states in the automaton.
Therefore we decompose the input formula by creating nodes or graph nodes that
represent the different ways a formula may be satisfied, allowing us to associate states -
and therefore label transitions - with conjunctions of literals rather than more complex
temporal formulae. Once a node has been completely processed, it either becomes a
distinct state in the automaton, is folded into an existing state, or is discarded due to
a logical contradiction. After every node has been processed, all that remains is to
identify the accepting states.
Nodes
A node N has the following fields:
NAME: The unique name of the node.
INCOMING: A list of nodes that have transitions to this node.
NEW: Properties which must hold at this state, yet to be processed.
OLD: A list of properties which guard incoming transitions, already processed.
NEXT: Properties to hold at immediately subsequent states.
A node N consists of a unique name, a field called INCOMING that contains a record
of every node that may transition to N, and three fields that contain LTL formulae.
First is the NEW field, which contains a set of LTL properties, yet to be processed, that
must hold at N. After formulae in NEW have been broken down into literals, they are
placed in the OLD field. These literals guard the transition from the INCOMING node
to node N. While a node is being processed, it only has one INCOMING node, but after
a node is added to the set of states it may have multiple INCOMING transitions, and
so OLD may then contain sets of literals, one set to guard each transition. Finally, the
NEXT field contains LTL formulae that must hold at any state immediately following
the current.
I denote nodes as:
Nname ({Nincoming} , {Anew}, {Aold}, {Anext})
Initialization
We begin compilation by creating an initial node No to be the start state of the
automaton:4
No (0, 0, 0, 0)
This node, a convenience node for identifying the start states of the automaton, does
not need to be processed and is added directly to the set of states. Next, we create
the node that will contain the input formula and add it to the list of nodes to be
processed:
Ninput (No, Ainput, 0, 0)
Now the goal is to process every node by repeatedly decomposing the formulae
in the NEW field. This decomposition is accomplished by identifying the distinct
ways in which a formula may be satisfied and by creating new nodes to deal with
different satisfaction scenarios. A node is fully processed when its NEW field is empty.
41n this section, subscripts such as No are used merely as an indexing number, the initial node,
rather than a time index, the node N at time 0.
Compilation ends when all nodes have been fully processed.
Processing Nodes
Our goal in processing a certain node N1 is to reduce all formulae in its NEW field to
literals. If a formula is encountered during processing that may be satisfied in more
than one way, then a new node N2 is created so that together, Ni and N 2 represent
all possible ways that the formula may be satisfied. Any literals remaining in a node's
OLD field after processing represent the literals that must hold at that node of the
automaton.
Spatial Processing Some formulae may be satisfied in two spatially distinct ways,
meaning that there two distinct assignments to literals at a certain time that will
satisfy the formula. For instance, the formula a V # may be true if either a or 0
is currently true. If we remove this formula from the NEW field of node N1 during
processing, we have N1 assert that a is true, and we also create a new node N2 that
asserts /3 rather than a. Because a and / might be formulae requiring additional
decomposition, we put a back into the NEW field of N1, and # into the NEW field of
the new node, N2 -
N1(N(, a , Aola, Anext)
N1 (Ni, a V #3 , Aozd, Anext) -->
N 2 (Ni, 3 , Aold, Anext)
Notice that all other fields remain the same, including the incoming field.
This decomposition may be thought of in terms of the automaton as well. Before
decomposition, node Ni had an incoming transition guarded by a V /, and by Aold.
O (a V #3) A Ao0I>dN
After decomposition, there exist two nodes, each with a non-deterministic incoming
transition guarded by either a or /, and Aold.
/\Nold Ni
qi
1 Aoi N20 o 0d
Temporal Processing A formula may be satisfied in two temporally distinct ways,
meaning that there are two classes of assignments to literals across time that will
satisfy the formula. These types of formulae will be handled differently; temporal
obligations will be pushed down to the next node. For example, consider the case in
which we encounter the formula a l/ while processing a node N 1. The decomposition
of this property relies on the following identity:
a U = / V [a A O(a U3)] (3.4)
This equivalence states "either 13 is true now, or a is true now and a U/ is true at the
next time step." The two halves of the disjunction represent all ways in which a U13
may be satisfied. If # is true now, then a U13 is satisfied for all time. If a is true now
then a U/ has not been violated, yet has not been permanently satisfied; therefore, it
must be enforced again at the next time step.
Following the algorithm for the a V / case, we create a new node N 2 to enforce
the first half of the disjunction in Equation (3.4), and leave Ni to enforce the second
half. The obligation represented by the "next" (0) portion of the formula is pushed
down to subsequent nodes by adding it to the NEXT field of node N 1.
Ni (Ni, a13,0, Anext) Ni (N , a , 0, Anext U(a 113))
N2 (Nz, 3, 0, Anext)
When a node N1 is turned into a state, a new node is created to handle any unfulfilled
temporal obligations in its NEXT field. This is discussed in the next section.
In terms of automata, this decomposition looks very similar to the case of a
disj unction.
Og a N1
Two nodes exist after decomposition, each with a nondeterministic incoming transition
guarded by either a or #. Additionally, node N1 records the fact that subsequent
nodes must enforce a U/.
a U# A Anext
a N1  ----+
qi
ATN2
Next consider the formula Wa. If we encounter this property while processing
node N 1, we decompose it according to the following:
Lla a A Q(la)
This equivalence states that "at the current time, a must be true, and starting at the
next time, a must always be true." A new node is not needed spatially because there
are not two ways at one time that this formula may be satisfied. Therefore, a new
node is not created. However, unfilled temporal obligations exist. These are pushed
down to subsequent nodes. a may require more processing, hence it is added back to
the list of properties in the NEW field.
N1 (Ni, { Anew}, 0 ) -> N1 (Ni, { a, Anew}, 0, 0 J oa)
Considered graphically, the transition between node Ni and N is simplified, and Ni
records the temporal obligation:
Lila A Anew a AAnew ' L'la
qi N1  ->N 1.  . . .
A similar case analysis can be performed for each type of LTL operator. The rules
for all operators are summarized in Table 3.2. In this table we see both halves of a
conjunction must hold at a node, and so both are processed separately for the node.
The release operator R is decomposed in almost the same manner as U. Finally,
the operators -> and 0 are translated into equivalent statements using V and U
respectively, from which decomposition proceeds as already described.
As formulae are processed, any literals are put directly into the OLD set. If ever
Table 3.2: Rules for decomposing an LTL formula f that was taken from the NEW
field of a node N1. For each type of formula, corresponding values indicated for NEW
and NEXT are added to the existing NEW and NEXT sets of N 1. If a NEW entry exists
for N2 , then a new node is cloned from (the original) N1 and augmented with the
NEW value for N 2.
f NEW Ni NEXT Ni NEW N2
a A/ {a, 0} 0
a-# -,aV#3 0
Oa TUa 0
Da a Lla
aV/3 a 0 /3
au3 a au #
aR# 3 aR3 {a,# }
there is a contradiction in OLD, that node is discarded.' When the NEW field of a
node is empty, it has been fully processed.
Adding Nodes to the Set of States
After a node N1 has been fully processed, it may be folded into an existing state or
added to the set of states as a unique new member. A node N1 is folded together with
a state qi if the NEXT field of N1 is equivalent to the NEXT field of qi. Otherwise, the
node is not equivalent to any existing state and is added as a new state. In either case,
the addition of a node to the set of states adds a new transition to the automaton,
which is guarded by the set of literals in the OLD field of N 1.
Adding New States When a node N1 is added to the set of states, an incoming
transition is created from the state Ni in INCOMING. This transition is guarded by
the set of literals in OLD, as they represent everything that is true at N 1. If the OLD
field is empty (0), then the transition is unguarded, or equivalently, guarded by T.
To enforce the temporal obligations represented in the NEXT field, a new node N 2 is
5The OLD field contains the literals that must be true in order to be in the current state, so if
there are contradictions in the OLD field, then we can never reach this state, and thus we can safely
discard it.
created that follows N1 and is added to the queue of nodes waiting to be processed:
N2 (N1 , ANiNEXT, 0,0)
For example, consider a node Ni (NO, 0, a, Lla). This node is fully processed because
the NEW field is empty, and so we add it to the set of states. We then create a node
N 2 as described above:
N2 (N1 , Wa, 0, 0)
Graphically:
a N1 -> N2
Folding States Together Because two nodes with identical NEXT fields represent
equivalent states6 , we do not add a new state to the automaton if one already exists
with the same NEXT field.7 Instead, we collapse the states together. For example, if
node N2 (Nj, 0, 0, Lla) has the same NEXT field as the already existing state qi that
was created from the node Ni (Ni, 0, a, na), then we incorporate the new information
by adding a new transition to state qi. This transition will be from N2's incoming
state, to qi, and is guarded by N2's old field.
Ela
-Z:> qi ..........>
N2  q, 0
Figure 3-4: Example of folding nodes together when adding a new node to a BA under
construction. After node N2 is completely processed, it is folded into state qi because
they have the same NEXT fields.
When a node is folded into an existing state, no new node is added to the process
queue. Intuitively, this is why compilation will eventually halt.
6 Equivalent in the sense that they encode the same temporal obligations.
'A node may not be equivalent to the initial state qo, even if it has the same NEXT field (0).
Wrapping Up
Finally, after all nodes have been processed and all states of the automaton obtained,
it remains to identify the accepting states. Intuitively, the Nondeterministic Biichi
Automaton operates by rejecting immediately as soon as any safety (0) constraint is
violated. Therefore any state qs representing the fulfillment of a safety constraint is
an accepting state. As long as q, is marked, the safety constraint is being met and
therefore the automaton is accepting. Compilation operates by pushing temporal
obligations into the NEXT field, so any eventualities that have not been satisfied at a
state will reside in the NEXT field. Additionally, these eventualities must be represented
by U due to the decomposition rule of converting "eventually" (O) properties into a
U properties. Therefore any state q, with a formulae containing U in its NEXT field
is not an accepting state; it represents an unfulfilled temporal obligation. This type
of state is a waiting state. All other states, except for the start state, are marked as
accepting states. Additionally, once construction is complete and accepting states are
identified, the NEXT fields of states may be removed, as this information is only used
to identify equivalent states and accepting states.
In the next section I give a formal algorithm for compilation. In Section 3.4.3 I give
a detailed example of how compilation is performed on the example LTL requirement
(3.3), given at the beginning of this section.
3.4.2 A Procedural Description of Compilation
In this section I present pseudocode for the algorithm described in the preceding section,
for compiling an LTL statement Aipt into a Buchi Automaton. See Algorithms 2
and 3 on page 59.
Algorithm 2: BA-COMPILE
The set of states Q is initialized in line 2 of BA-COMPILE and the initial state qo is
added to Q. The queue of nodes to be processed P is initialized in line 3 and the node
containing the input formula is added. The boolean trash (line 4) records whether or
Algorithm 2: BA-COMPILE
1: procedure BA-COMPILE(Ai,,pt)
2: Q -No (0, 0, 0, 0)
3: P <- ,.t (No, {Ainput}, 0, 0)
4: trash = F
5: while P # 0 do
6: N <- dequeue(P)
7: while N.NEW / 0 do
8: [Nnew, trash] <- EXPAND(N)
9: enqueue(P, Nnew)
> Create process queue and add Ninput
> While process queue is not empty
> add Nne, to process queue, may
have no effect if Nne, = 0
end while
if trash then
continue > Node is discarded
end if
if I(q E Q) st q.NEXT= N.NEXT then > State q is equivalent to N
q.INCOMING = q.INCOMING U N.INCOMING
q.OLD = q.OLD U {N.OLD}
else
add(Q, N)
Nnew = (N, N.NEXT, 0, 0)
enqueue(P, Nnew)
end if
end while
end procedure
c> add N to states
> add Nnew to process queue
;orithm 3: EXPAND
procedure {N2 , trash} = EXPAND(N 1)
N2 = {0}
trash = F
f <- pop(N.NEW)
if f is a literal then
Ni.OLD = N.OLD U f
if Ni.OLD is unsatisfiable then
trash = T
end if
else if f is one of (V, U, or R) then
N2 = N1
[NN 2 ] +- TABLE-3.2(f)
else
N <-- TABLE-3.2(f)
end if
return {N 2, trash}
end procedure
L> clone node N
> f IS ONE OF (A, -*, 0, OR D)
Al
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
not a node contains a contradiction and is to be discarded.
For each node N in P, the algorithm performs EXPAND until N.NEXT is empty.
EXPAND returns T for trash if N is to be discarded, and may also return a new node
(line 8). If a new node is returned (Ne, 0), then it is added to P in line 9. After
a node is fully processed (line 10), then it is either discarded in line 12, folded in with
equivalent state q in lines 15 and 16, or added to Q in line 18. In the last case, a new
node is created to process N.NEXT in line 19, and is added to P. When all nodes have
been processed (line 22), the set of states Q contains all states of the BA.
After the procedure BA-COMPILE is performed, accepting states of Q are identified
as described in the preceding section, and the NEXT fields may be deleted.
Algorithm 3: EXPAND
The EXPAND procedure begins by removing its working formula f from the NEW field
of the input node Ni in line 4. If f is a literal, then no more processing is required, so
f is placed in N 1 .OLD (line 6) and Ni.OLD is checked for satisfiability. If a conflict is
found, the trash flag is set to T (line 9), indicating that N1 is to be discarded. If f
is not a literal, then it is decomposed according to Table 3.2. If the operator of f is
either V, U, or R, a new node N2 is created with a unique name, and all its fields
are set equal to those of N1 in line 11. The NEW and NEXT fields of nodes N1 and
N2 are then augmented according to the table in line 12. If f does not require a new
node, then only N1 is altered according to Table 3.2 in line 14. EXPAND returns a
new node if one was created, and the trash flag indicating the presence or absence of
contradictions in Ni.OLD.
3.4.3 An Example of Compilation
In this section I detail the compilation of an LTL property into a Biichi Automata
according to Algorithm 2. Compilation is applied to the property stated in Equation
(3.3), which is restated here:
A 2 El(FAULT-MONITOR= T -+ D(CONTROL-REQUEST-GRANTED= F))
Recall that compilation of Property (3.3) produces the following list of states and
transitions:
Table 3.3: The list of states that is produced when Algorithm BA-COMPILE is
performed on formula (3.3).
Beginning with Algorithm 2, we create No and add it to the set of states. This
node is the initial state of the automaton. For the purposes of this example, states are
named after the node that they were created from, hence node No becomes state q0.
Q ={ No (0, 0, 0, 0) }
Next we create N1 and add it to the to-process queue, per line 3 of the algorithm.
This node begins with the input formula A2 = L(FM-* Dl-,CRG) in its NEW field, and
has the start state qo as its INCOMING state. For the purposes of this example, we
depict nodes graphically as members of the automaton, though they technically do
not become part of the automaton as states until they are fully processed. Transitions
are guarded by the contents of the NEW and OLD fields of a node. Recall nodes are
written Nname (INCOMINGNEW, OLD,NEXT).
P = {iNA(FM 
-N ( 2CRG) > N 1
Now we EXPAND node N 1, which is the only node on the queue. First we remove
A 2 from the NEW field. This formula is of the form Ea, so according to Table 3.2, we
put (FM --> -CRG) back in the NEW field for further processing, and we put the full
Transition
State
INCOMING Guard
go 0
go -FM
qi -FM
q0  -CRG
gi -CRG
q2  -CRG A -FM
q2 -CRG
formula, A 2, into the NEXT field.
P {N(No, (FM -- -,CRG), o, A 2) FM .CRG 2
Another expansion of N1 turns the implication into a disjunction:
-iFVLIj--CRGA 2P ={N1(No, (-1FM V E-,CRG), o, A2 ) , .F V
The next expansion of N1 first removes the disjunction f = -FM V E,1-CRG from NEW.
According to Table 3.2, we must create a new node to enforce the second half of the
disjunction. This node, N2, is cloned from N1 after the removal of f, and then one
half of the formula is added to each NEW field.
A 2
P ={N(NO, ,FM, O, A2), q0 N1----
N2 (No, I-CRG, 0, A2) 2 ..G.N >
To finish processing N1 , we remove f = -FM from the NEW field. Because f is a
literal, we put it directly into the OLD field; no further decomposition is required.
Now we may add N1 to the set of states. Additionally, because there are unfulfilled
temporal obligations in the NEXT field of N1, we must create a new node N3 to
enforce them. This node is created downstream of N 1, with A 2 in its NEW field.
Q ={N (0, 0, 0, 0), A
Ni (No, 0, -FMA 2)
qo
P ={ N2 (No, -iCRG, o, A2), A2
N3 (N1 , A 2, 0, 0) }
After fully processing N1 , the next node on the process queue P is N2. We remove
f = E-,CRG from N 2 .NEW and decompose it as before, putting -ICRG in N 2 .NEW, and
all of f in N 2 .NEXT. One more decomposition step moves the literal -CRG to the OLD
field of N2, which completes the decomposition process for this node.
P ={ N 2 (No, 0, ,CRG, {A 2 , I-iCRGl), 1 A2  3
N3 (N 1 , A 2 , 0, O) } A2 A N2 +N ,CRG
Now N2 is fully processed. Because it has a unique NEXT field, it is also added to the
set of states and we create a new node N4 to enforce the contents of N 2 .NEXT.
Q {N (0, 0, 0, 0),
N1 (No, 0,-FMA 2), qg A2
N2 (No, 0, -CRG, (A 2 , -,CRG}) } qo
>(A A
P={ N3 (N 1 , A2, 0, 0), o G 2 : N4
-,CRG
N4 (N 2, {A 2, 0-iCRG, O, 0) }
Next on the queue is N3. This node has same content that N1 did when it was first
added to P. Processing it will have a similar effect. First, the "always" (0) obligation
is pushed down to the NEXT node, and the implication becomes a disjunction.
PFM V OCRG A2
N(N {i,> N3 -... 0P ={ N3 (Ni, ,FM VEACRG, 0,A2), qo
N4 (N2, {A 2, L1-,CRG), 0, 0) } A2 A
Go q2 >N4NEN] -, C RG
Then the node is split on the disjunction, spawning node Ns.
A2
FM N3----
P =N3 (N, O, M, A2)q, N3 ..FM} 2 )
N2 (N,0,-CRGA,I-1CR})2
N4 (N2 , {A 2, 1-CRG), , q) go N
N5 (N 1, E-,CRG, 0, A2) % q2 A NE1,CRG
Now N3 is fully processed. However, it is equivalent to the state qi, as they have
the same NEXT fields. Hence we fold it in with qi , which means that we add the
INCOMING and OLD fields of N3 into those of qi as parallel entries. In terms of the
automaton, this means that instead of a new state, we add a new transition from N1
to N3: a self transition.
,FM-
Q ={No (0, 0, 0, 0),
N1 ({No, N1}, 0, { ,F M, ,-F M),A2), qg A2
N2(No, 0,,-CRG, (A2,E C,CRG}) } go [Jn-cRG N ..--------- >
P ={ N4 (N2, { A2, EICRG), 0, O ) q2 A2 A
],CR N4
N5 (N1, E0,CRG, O, A2) I}11R
The next node, N4, has two formulae in its NEW field. First we pop A 2 = E(FM -M
E-CRG) off the NEW field. Similar to the other times we decomposed this formula, we
push the always (D) obligation down, create a new node N6 for half of the disjunction,
and move the literal -FM to N 4 's OLD field.
,FM A
IN 5 
----- >
P={ N4 (N 2 , -,CRG, -FM, A 2 ) qG A2
N5 (N1 , l-,CRG, 0, A 2) 0 C N4 ----+
N6 (N2 , {LLCRG, L,CRG),O,A 2) q2 A2
We continue processing N4 by removing f = E1-CRG from NEW, pushing the temporal
obligation down, and depositing -,CRG in the OLD field.
,- FM A2
P={N 4 (N 2, 0,{-,FM, ,CRG}, {A 2 , LCRG}) q 0C A2
N6(N 1, I-CRG, o, A2) gC
N6 (N 2, {LCRG, LCRG}, o, A2) q2 A2
'G N6 ------ +
Now we may add N4 to the set of states. However, N4 is equivalent to state q2 , so
we fold N4 and q2 together, resulting in a self transition on q2 . Note how the list of
states and their corresponding transitions, rewritten here as a table, is beginning to
resemble Table 3.3.
-FM
E,-CRG A2
P ={ N 5 (N1, -,CRG, 0, A 2) }
go
N 6 (N 2 , {LCRG, LCRG,0,A2) I A2
Qo q2 N 
-7FM A -CRG
The next node on the queue for processing is N5 , which contains 1-CRG in its
NEW field. As with many nodes before it, the temporal obligation will be pushed to
the NEXT node and -,CRG is added to N5 .OLD:
-FM
P ={ N5 (N1 , 0, -CRG, (A 2 , -CRG}) }
N6 (N 2 , {-,CRG, I-CRG), 0, A 2 ) }
-,FM A -CRG
Node N5 is equivalent to q2 . Folding it into the automaton results in a transition from
q1 to N5 = q2.
-FM
P ={ N6 (N 2 , {I-CRG, I-CRG}, O, A2 ) }
,CRGgo
LI-,CRG A 2Qq2  N6 . ..>
-FM A -CRG
The final node, N6, decomposes exactly as N5 did. N6 is also equivalent to q2 ,
hence results in another self transition on q2.
State INC OLD NEXT
q0  0
q1 q0 ,FM A2gi -FM
go CRG
q2 { -CRG A 2 , 1-1CRG}
q2 ,FM A ,-CRG
-FMState INC OLD NEXT
q0 0
gi g0 ,FM A 2gi -FM
qo -,CRG
q2  -FM A -CRG
Q2RA 2 , ,CRG)
gi -CRG
All nodes have been processed. Now we identify the accepting states by examining the
content of the NEXT fields for U formulae. Because no states contain a U formula in
NEXT field, none represent a liveness condition that has not been met. Consequently,
both qi and q2 are marked as accepting states. In general, the initial state may not be
accepting in case the input formula contains eventualities [18].
-,FM
,RG
q0
-FM A -CRG
This automaton is equivalent to the one presented in the BA operation example in
Section 3.3.2. We see this by combining the self transitions on state q2 , and by removing
the start state q0. Combination of the transitions on q2 is simple enough: we create a
disjunction of the two guards, and then note that the sentence (-,FM A -CRG) V -CRG
can only be satisfied if CRG = F. Removal of the start state is less trivial. This
thesis does not present a general method for doing so.' In many cases, including this
8In the construction presented by Gerth et al. [17], the INIT state is created solely to identify
the set of starting states Qo; every state that has INIT as its INCOMING state is a member of Q0.
The INIT state is not actually a state of the automata they build. When dealing with finite traces,
Giannakopoulou and Havelund [18] also discuss the removal of the start state but do not present a
general method.
-FM A -CRG
one, the start state may be removed and all of the states it transitions to may be
marked as initial states of the automaton. In this case, marking q2 as an initial state
is unnecessary due to the configuration of the transitions, hence qi becomes the sole
initial state.
-FM
-CRG
,CRG
It is worth mentioning a few decomposition cases involving the empty set 0 that
did not arise in this example.
1. If a node is added to the automaton as a state with an empty OLD field, then the
transition to this state is guarded by T. This transition is satisfied no matter what
the input to the automaton is, and so is taken automatically.
2. If a node has an empty NEXT field when being added to the automaton, it is
equivalent to another state (not the start state) that has an empty NEXT field, and
therefore if there exists such a state, the two should be folded together.
3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented an automata-based approach to runtime verification. System
specifications are written in Linear Temporal Logic, compiled to an equivalent Bichi
Automaton, and the automaton is executed on the program trace at runtime. The
automaton is accepting if the specification is being met, and rejects if the specification
is violated.
The next chapter presents a novel approach to runtime verification that extends
the methods in this chapter, allowing .for the monitoring of stochastic, faulty hardware
systems.
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Chapter 4
Estimating System Safety:
Runtime Verification for
Embedded Systems
Plant model
Plant (physical) state
Observations
x at time t
short for {z1 , z2 , ... , Zt}
A
q
C
W
QSAFE
4.1 Derivation of Exact
Formal safety specification
Safety state
Commands
A word legible to a Bdchi Automaton
The set of SAFE states of a DBA
Runtime Verification for
Stochastic Systems
In the previous chapter I presented the solution to the problem of safety monitoring
of software systems in which state can be directly observed. In this chapter I extend
the problem to that of safety monitoring of mixed hardware / software systems that
can fail, and I solve this problem by incorporating stochastic behavior and hidden
state. I then present the exact equations needed to perform safety monitoring of these
embedded systems.
<1)
x
z
xt
Zi:t
4.1.1 Calculating Safety for Observable Systems
This thesis presents a capability for monitoring the safety of complex hardware/software
embedded systems at runtime. Safety monitoring for purely software systems is
accomplished using the technique of runtime verification, presented previously. As
we saw in Chapter 3, runtime verification of a system involves monitoring the system
online and verifying that it behaves correctly, where the definition of "correctness"
is supplied as a formal specification. We also saw that we can build a capability for
runtime verification when this formal specification is written in Linear Temporal Logic.
This capability, denoted RV, takes as input a correctness specification A in LTL and
an incremental program trace W at runtime. W is a sequence of letters or such that
each letter o- in W is a representation of the system state x at time i, abbreviated as
xi. At every time step, RV returns TRUE if W is consistent with A, and FALSE if it is
not.
A > RV > {1, o}
W = Xo:t
In Section 3.1 I described an algorithm that provides this function: LTL specifications
are compiled into Nondeterministic Biichi Automata (BA), which are then run on the
program trace. If any BA ever rejects, then the program is violating its corresponding
safety specification and is deemed unsafe. Thus the RV capability is realized through
the execution and monitoring of a BA, a function presented in Section 3.3.2.
A > BA-COMPILE(A) A - BA-RUN(W) > {1,O}
W = XO:t
We can apply the same method to mixed hardware/software systems if we assume
that the state of the hardware and software is directly observable. In this case, instead
of running on a software trace, the BA is run on the state history for the entire
hardware/software system. Practically, the difference is that the system state x is
extended to include hardware as well as software state.
However, due to incomplete or faulty sensing, it is not realistic to assume that the
state of an embedded system is generally observable. In the next section we consider
the case in which the system state x is hidden and A involves these hidden states.
Since the system state trajectory W can no longer be directly observed, we can no
longer directly calculate the safety of the system using traditional runtime verification.
Instead, we estimate the safety as a belief distribution.
4.1.2 Extension to Hidden-State
Similar to the case of an HMM, drawing the system as a time-evolving graphical
model is a compact way to represent variable dependences. See Figure 4-1:
. .
.
-
t 1 
c
Figure 4-1: A graphical model of an embedded system. The commands into the
system are represented by c, observations z, physical system (hardware and software)
state is x, and safety state is q. Subscripts denote time.
In this graphical model, c represents commands sent to the system and z represents
observations received from the system, sometimes called the evidence. The state
of the physical system, including both hardware and software, is represented by x.
Additionally, q is the safety state of the system, defined as the state of the BA that
describes a safety constraint on the system. In a graphical model, arrows denote
conditional dependencies, so xt is conditionally dependent on ct and xt_1, but is
independent of all other variables given ct and Xt_1. We make the standard simplifying
assumption that commands ct are independent of previous state xt_1.
Under the assumption that x is observable, it is apparent from Figure 4-1 that we
have all the information needed to calculate qt, the state of the BA at time t. However,
when we generalize this model and remove the assumption that x is observable, this
is no longer possible. The problem of safety monitoring can no longer be solved by
runtime verification methods alone.
Instead, we want a capability that will evaluate the safety of the system given the
available information: a safety specification A, a plant model b, the control sequence
ci:t, and observation sequence z1:t. 1 Because we can no longer estimate qt precisely,
we instead estimate the probability that the system remains consistent with A, that is,
the probability that the system is SAFE.
A, P > ? > P(SAFE)
Ci:t, Zl:t
Let Q denote the set of states of the Deterministic Biichi Automaton (DBA) for A,
and let QSAFE denote the set Q/q0 . That is, QSAFE is the set Q with the trap state qo
removed. This trap state is discussed at the end of Section 4.2.3. The probability
P(SAFE) is then equivalent to the probability of being in a SAFE state of the BA at
time t:2
P(SAFE) = P(qt e QSAFE)
This probability can be derived from the probability distribution over states q of
the DBA at time t, given the commands and observations, by summing over the SAFE
states QSAFE:
P(SAFE) = P(qt lzi:t,ci:t) (4.1)
qj EQSAFE
Thus the problem of stochastic safety monitoring of embedded systems reduces to the
problem of finding the probability distribution over BA states q, conditioned on the
history of observations and commands. This probability distribution over q is often
1Here subscripts denote time, hence Xt denotes x at time t, and zi:t is the vector of z's from time
1 to t.
2 Summing over all states of the automaton except the trap state is necessary for the correct
monitoring of liveness conditions.
called a belief state, hence we abbreviate it as B(qt).
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with the calculation of B(qt). Section
4.2 derives an expression for B(qt) in terms of the system model and the DBA
characteristics. Section 4.3 goes into more detail on the system model.
4.2 Calculating Safety Belief
This section presents a derivation for
B(qt) = P(qtI z1:t, ci:t) (4.2)
the belief state over states q of the Bichi Automaton at time t.
An intuitive but inefficient solution is presented first, followed by a more elegant
yet abstract solution in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 The Folly of Ignoring Conditional Dependencies
Given that we have mature capabilities for estimating system state on an appropriate
and expressive plant model [28,40], one might hope that such a capability could be
incorporated directly into the safety estimator developed for this thesis. Unfortunately,
this is not the case. In this section we briefly consider why.
Assume we are given the belief B(x) = P(Xt Z1:t, ci:t). Additionally, assume
P(qtlxt, qt-i), the DBA transition probability, is known. One might hope that B(qt)
could be obtained recursively as follows:
B (qt) = P(qtIlzt, qt-_1) B (zt) B (qt-_1) (4.3)
xt qt-1
However, an attempt to derive Equation (4.3) from B(qt) = P(qt IZ1:t, cit) fails. First,
summing over physical state xt and previous safety state qp_1 gives Equation (4.4),
applying the Chain Rule gives (4.5), and noting conditional independencies yields
(4.6):
P(qt Z1:t, Ci:t) P(qt, xt, qt-i Zi:t, Cl:t) (4.4)
xt qt-i
= E P (qt xt, qt-1, Z:t, ci:t) P(xt qt- 1, Z1:t, c1:t)(qt-1 Z1:t, Ci:t) (4.5)
xt qt 1
E E P (t xt, qt- 1) P t I t- 1, z1:t , c1:t) P(t- 1 1:t, C1:t) -46
xt qt-1
Equation (4.6) is not in the recursive form of a belief state update equation as the
previous belief B(qt,) = P(qt_1|zi:t_1, ci:t-1) does not appear. Neither does the
known quantity B(xt) appear. In order to equate Equations (4.6) and (4.3), the
following assumptions must be made:
1. P(xtlqt_1, zi:t, c1.t) ~~" P(xtlz1:t, ci:t) = B(xt)
2. P(qt-1 z1:t, cl:t) ~ P(qt 1 |z:t_1, ci:t 1) = B(qt__1)
Figure 4-1 shows that these assumptions are incorrect for our system, therefore the
approach to safety estimation represented by Equation (4.3) is flawed.
In order to preserve the conditional dependencies illustrated in Figure 4-1 while
also separating estimation of the plant state x from estimation of the safety state q,
we need to keep a record of the history of state trajectories xo:t, as seen in the next
section.
4.2.2 A Slow Approach: Counting Every Trajectory
Alternatively, the desired safety monitoring capability could build on mature capa-
bilities for calculating a belief over system state trajectories, rather than system
state. That is, we assume that B(Xz:t) = P(xo:tlz1:t, ci:t) is known. While this second
approach is technically correct, tracking trajectory history is expensive. This section
presents one approach for doing so.
To obtain a relation for B(qt), first we sum over all system state trajectories Xo:t
in Equation (4.7), then apply the Chain Rule in Equation (4.8). Using Figure 4-1, we
note that qt is conditionally independent of commands and observations, given a state
history xo:t, hence Equation (4.9). We apply (4.1) to obtain the final relation (4.10).
P (qtI l:t, ci:t) = : P (qt , xo:t Izi~ e, ci t) (4.7)
XO: EXo:t
= P(qt xo:t, zi:t, ci t)P(xo:t Zi:t, ci.t) (4.8)
XO: EXo:t
S P (qt xo:t) P(xo:t Z1:t, Ci:t) (4.9)
O:tcXo:t
P(SAFE) = P(q |xo:t)P(zi:t, ci:t) (4.10)
qi EQSAFE XO:tCXO:t
Intuitively, to calculate P(SAFE) by Equation (4.10), we count all of the state
trajectories Xo:t E Xo:t that terminate in SAFE states q E QSAFE and weight each
trajectory by its likelihood P(zo:tlz1:t, ci:t). However, while this approach is consistent
with the conditional dependencies illustrated in Figure 4-1, the cost of enumerating
all feasible state trajectories increases exponentially with time, a rather undesirable
quality.
To address this problem we note that the probability P(qt, XO:t z1:t, Ci:t) from
Equation (4.7) can be viewed as the belief over a combined system state < qt, Xo:t >.
This combined state actually records more information than is necessary for safety
estimation. Analysis of the graphical model in Figure 4-1 reveals that there is a
cheaper combination of system states that will record the necessary information. We
exploit this analysis in the next section.
4.2.3 A Good Approach: Combining Physical and Safety
States
As is apparent in the graphical model of Figure 4-1, what makes this estimation
problem computationally expensive are the undirected cycles in the graph. Because
the physical state x and safety state q at each time are interdependent, 3 they cannot
3That is, they are not d-separated given observations and commands.
be estimated separately without expense, as in Equation (4.10). If we do not insist
that the plant state x and the safety state q are estimated separately, then we can
remove these cycles and therefore estimate over a much smaller space than < qt, zo.t >.
Let yt represent the complete system state < qt, xt > and let B(yt) denote the
belief over y at time t, that is B(yt) = P(qt, xtjzi:t, ci:t). The graphical model in
Figure 4-1, viewed in terms of y, is equivalent to a canonical hidden Markov model:
Figure 4-2: Graphical model from Figure 4-1 with clustered state y = q 0 x
The belief B(qt) is obtained by marginalizing xt out of B(y,) = P(qt, xtIzi:t, ci:t):
B(qt) = P(qtIz1:t, ci:t) = l: P(qt, xtIz1:t, ci:t) (4.11)
Xt
and B(yt) is obtained through standard HMM filtering. For completeness, Equations
(4.12)-(4.16) derive the Forward algorithm. Applying Bayes' rule to (4.12) yields
(4.13), where q is a normalizing constant. Summing over previous state yt-1 gives
(4.14). By conditional independence of yt given yt_1 and ct, we have (4.16):
B(yt) = P(yt zi:t, ci:t) = P(yzt, zi:t 1, ci:t) (4.12)
= 77P(ztlyt, zi _-1, ci:t)P(ytlz1:t_1, ci:A (4.13)
= 7P (zt lyt) YP(yt, yt_1| Izi~t_1, ci:t) (4.14)
Yt-1
= nP (zt ly) E P (yt l yt_1, zi~t_ 1, ci:t) P (y_1|Iz1:t_1I, ci:t) (4.15)
Yt-1
B (yt) = nP (zt Ilyt) :P (yt l yt_1, ct) B (yt_ 1) (4.16)
Yt-1
Equation (4.16) computes the belief state over the combined system state y, which
can also be thought of as the combined BA / PHCA state. To obtain a relation
in terms of functions specified by these models, we manipulate (4.16) further by
expanding y in the observation probability P(zelyt) and the transition probability
P(tlyt- , ct), giving us (4.17). Applying the Chain Rule and simplifying based on
conditional independence arguments yields (4.18):
B(yt) =qP(zt qt, xt) 1 P(qt, xt qt 1, xt 1, ct) B(yt 1) (4.17)
Yt-1
= y (zt xt) :P (qtIlot, qt-_1) P(xt Ixt_ 1, ct) B (yt- 1) (4.18)
Yt-1
Substituting Equation (4.18) into (4.11) produces the following, where rj is a normal-
ization constant:
B(qt) = 3 E P(zt Ixt) E P(qt Ixt, qt 1)P(xt xt_1, ct) B(yt 1) (4.19)
Xt Yt-1
Equation (4.19), which computes the belief state over the BA, is similar to the
standard Forward algorithm for HMM belief state update (4.16). First, the next state
is stochastically predicted based on each previous belief B(yt) and on the transition
probabilities of the models, then this prediction is corrected based on the observations
received. An additional sum marginalizes out xt, and the result is normalized by n. The
observation probability P(zt Ixt) and the transition probability P(xtIxt 1, ct) are both
functions of the model of the physical system. Section 4.3 discusses the calculation of
these probabilities in the case that the plant is modeled as a Probabilistic Hierarchical
Constraint Automaton. The transition probability P(qtjxt, qt-1) is a function of the
safety specification, and is computed according to (4.21), given in the next subsection.
The cost of computing (4.19) is entirely dependent on the sizes of Q and X. In
order to find the probability of each qt, we must loop twice over these sets. If n is the
size of the combined set, n =IQ x XI, then we have a time complexity of O(n 2), and
a space complexity of O(n).
Finally, given the belief state determined by Equation (4.19), the probability that
the system is currently SAFE is given by:
P(SAFE) = q E P(ztlxt) E P(qtlxt, qt-_)P(rtjXti, ct) B(yt 1) (4.20)
qtEQSAFE Xt Yt-1
Deterministic Biichi Automata
The value of the transition probability P(qtlxt, qt,) from Equation (4.19) depends
on the transition function T of the underlying Blichi Automaton for the safety
requirements. However, for a nondeterministic Biichi Automaton (NBA), T does
not represent a true probability distribution because E, T(q, o) $ 1. One way to
address this is to convert the NBA to a Deterministic Bichi Automaton (DBA) for
the purposes of estimation.
It is known that canonical DBA on infinite inputs are not as expressive as their
nondeterministic counterparts (see [4], page 188), and therefore canonical NBA cannot
generally be converted to DBA. However, the NBA considered in this thesis are
modified to accept finite traces. For finite traces, these automata are equivalent to
nondeterministic finite automata (NFA) [18], which can be converted to an equivalent
deterministic finite automaton (DFA) without loss of expressiveness. This conversion,
known as subset construction or powerset construction, works by creating a state in
the DFA for every possible combination of states in the NFA [35].
After conversion, a DBA contains a special state q0 that represents a violation of
the safety requirements. This state is the only state of the automaton that is not SAFE,
therefore the probability that the system is SAFE is found by summing the likelihood
of all other states, as Equation (4.1) shows. This 'trap' state q0 represents the empty
configuration of the NBA or the configuration in which no states are marked, and has
a TRUE self-loop, representing the fact that a failed computation on an NBA cannot
restart.
The transition probability P(qt Irt, qt-1) in Equation (4.19) can be obtained from
the transition function TD of the specified Deterministic Biichi Automaton as follows:
J1 if TD(t1, Xt) =9
P (qt IXt, qt-i1) 1 i Dq-1,x)=qt(4.21)
0 otherwise
4.2.4 Section Summary
This section derived an equation for estimating the safety belief of a stochastic system.
The belief is calculated according to Equation (4.19) at each time step, and the overall
probability that the system is SAFE is calculated with Equation (4.20). The solution
represented by these equations can be obtained at each time step for a cost in time of
O(n 2), where n is size of the combined state of the system Q||XI.
The next section discusses the modeling formalism.
4.3 The Probabilistic Hierarchical Constraint Au-
tomata Model
This section details the Probabilistic Hierarchical Constraint Automata, a plant model
suitable for representing reactive hardware/software systems.
4.3.1 Motivation for PHCA
This thesis provides a capability for the lifetime verification of embedded systems.
These complex systems tend to suffer from performance degradation due to random
hardware failure over their long and arduous life cycles.
In order to concisely and accurately model these mixed hardware/software systems
that may fail, this thesis utilizes the Probabilistic Hierarchical Constraint Automaton
(PHCA) formalism. PHCA allow for probabilistic behavior, a reasonable model of
random hardware failure.
Section 4.3.2 introduces PHCA with an example. Section 4.3.3 discusses briefly
the Reactive Model-based Programming Language (RMPL), which is the specification
,(SAFELANE=correcting) (SAFELANE=c orrecting)
CRG
d(error)
de <0 -0
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Figure 4-3: SAFELANE actuator component PHCA model.
language for PHCA. The formal definition of PHCA appears in Section 4.3.4. The
final section discusses estimation on PHCA, relating the formalism to Equation (4.19).
4.3.2 PHCA Description
A Probabilistic Hierarchical Constraint Automaton (PHCA) [40] is an automaton
that is designed to compactly and accurately model the behavior of complex systems
involving both hardware and software [28]. Like an HMM, PHCA may have hidden
states and transition probabilistically. Unlike an HMM, PHCA introduce the notion
of constraints on states as well as a hierarchy of component automata.
Systems are modeled as a set of individual PHCA components that communicate
through shared variables. Discrete modes of operation representing nominal and faulty
behavior are specified for each component. Components may transition between modes
probabilistically or based on system commands. Additionally, modes and transitions
may be constrained by the modes of other components.
Example PHCA
In Chapter 2, the SAFELANE example system is shown modeled as a PHCA. (See
Figure 2-1.) The same system could be modeled as an HMM, but the representation
would be far less compact, since all possible mode combinations would have to be
expanded.
As an example PHCA, an actuator component model is presented in Figure 4-3.
................ . .. . .. J- - - - - - - - - . - - - -
The actuator has two nominal and two failure modes. The nominal modes are idle and
actuating. The truth of CRG and SAFELANE=correcting is assumed to be observable
for the purposes of this example. Additionally, the error e = ||#desired - Gactuall , where
#desired is the command sent to the actuator, is known. If the time derivative of this
error is positive, then the actuator is assumed to be malfunctioning, or broken. The
system may escape the broken mode, but will be assumed to be in some unknown
operating mode perpetually if its behavior is ever inconsistent with its model.
4.3.3 Specifying PHCA in the Reactive Model-Based Pro-
gramming Language
A.
A 8HII
A: B
wwuyu,'
_aOezz
whwnver c donexA43asrz_
when c donextA
-*4L
ti c thennext A4O&ECA
unless c thennext A
f c thennext A elsenextB
Figure 4-4: Examples of the mapping between RMPL constructs and PHCA format.
PHCA are specified in the Reactive Model-based Programming Language (RMPL)
[41]. This section briefly introduces RMPL and its mapping to PHCA. See also [40,41]
for more detail on PHCA construction and background on RMPL.
RMPL consists of five primitive constructs. Many other, more complex constructs
can by derived from these five:
1. c : This constraint asserts that c is true at the initial time.
2. if c thennext A : This conditional branching construct causes A to begin
executing at the next time step if c is currently entailed.
3. A, B : This basic concurrency construct causes both A and B to begin executing
at the same time.
4. always A : This construct starts A at every time step
g
A mMannng c
NA#
do A wethingc
P . Im
I I
next A
5. choose A with p, B with q : This is the basic probabilistic choice construct,
allowing for the encoding of probabilistic knowledge about the system.
The translation of these and other combinators to PHCA is given in Figure 4-4.
Example RMPL
Below I give an example of the RMPL for the PHCA in Figure 4-3. This example is
specified in RMPLj, a Java-like derivative of RMPL, which includes many derived
combinators. See Figure 4-5.
class Actuator{
value idle - (SAFELANE-correcting);
value actuating - (,SAFELANE-correcting);
value broken;
value unknown;
transition up idle -> actuating with guard: CRG;
transition id idle -> idle;
transition ac actuating -> actuating;
transition down actuating -> idle;
transition break actuating -> broken with guard: DEDT;
transition fix broken -> actuating with guard: -DEDT with prob: 0.1;
transition unk ) -> unknown with prob: .W1;}
Figure 4-5: Example of an RMPLj specification for a PHCA plant model.
4.3.4 PHCA Formal Definition
Formally, a PHCA is defined as a tuple: C = (S, Pe, H, C, PT, PG, Po) [40].
S is the set of locations of the automaton, partitioned into S, and Sc, which are
the set of primitive locations and composite locations, respectively. Primitive
locations have no sub-functions, whereas composite locations are sub-automata.
Pe is the probability P(mt), which is the probability that m' is the initial marking
of the automaton. A marking is a set of locations m E 2S, the powerset of S.
H is a set of finite domain variables, where for each v E H, the domain is denoted
as the set D,. This set includes observation variables 0, dependent variables
D, and control variables C. Let # be a full assignment to H, that is to say, # is
...... .....
a set of assignments {v = ulVv E HI, such that u E ID,}, and let <D be the set of
full assignments. Let 7 be a partial assignment to finite domain variables, and
let the set of all partial assignments be denoted P.
C : S, - A is a function that associates each primitive location s E Sp with a finite
domain constraint a from the set of possible constraints A. That is to say, a
constrains the variables in its scope to take on only values from their domains
that are allowed by a's relation. Constraints in this thesis are expressed in
propositional state logic. A constraint C(s) is enforced whenever s is marked.
PT : Spx 7 -- [0,1] is distribution over possible transition functions 7 : A - 2s.
That is to say, a function 7 maps constraint g E A, also known as a guard
condition, into a marking m E 2S. PT(s) denotes a probability distribution
over the transitions associated with a primitive location s, and Pw(s, 7i) is the
probability of the transition Tp, which is a transition from s.
PG ' A x P x 2s - [0,1]. This is the probability that a guard condition g E A is
enabled given a partial assignment -r to control, observable, and dependent
variables, and a marking m E 2S. If 7r and m are such that g is satisfied or not,
then this probability is 1 or 0 respectively. In the case that some variables in
the scope of g are not known, PG is between 0 and 1.
Po : 0 x X -- [0,1] is the observation probability function. Given a state x which
includes a marking m and a full assignment to D, this function returns the
probability that an observation o is received, where o is a full assignment to 0.
Example The example PHCA of an actuator in Figure 4-3 is formally written:
S = {idle, act, brk, unk}
1 i f, mct, - I =l} {SLC, CRG, DEDT} where
Pe(m) = 0 ={DEDT} DDEDT {+,0}
0 otherwise
(C f {CRG}, IDCR, f1,0}f
SLC = 0 if s= idle
C(s) = SLC = 1 if act D = {SLC), IDSLC={1,0}
PT(s, T') SESp gEA m E2s
CRG act
.9999 T icjien idle
*T idle
.0001 Tidlef idle T unk
T {act, idle}
.9999 Tactn act
DEDT brk
.0001 Tactf act T unk
DEDT brk
0.1 Tb , brk
,'DEDT act
0.8999 Tb,k2  brk T brk
0.0001 Tbrkf brk T unk
T'unk unk T unk
The specification of PG and Po is discussed in the next section.
4.3.5 Calculating the Transition and Observation Probabili-
ties
To perform safety monitoring, Equation (4.19) requires a transition probability and an
observation probability for the plant model. This section derives these probabilities for
a PHCA. The transition probability describes the likelihood of transitioning to a state
Xt, given a previous state xt_1. This likelihood also depends on the values assigned
to finite domain variables. The observation probability describes the likelihood of
observing an assignment o to 0, given that x is the current state.
The Transition Probability
We are interested in knowing P(xt xt_1, ct), which is the probability of transitioning
from a state xti to a state xt, given a control action. The state x of a PHCA consists
of a marking m and a full assignment to dependent variables D, denoted d. Recall
that a transition T is defined as a function A -- 2S. That is, T maps a guard to
a marking. PT(s, Ti) is the probability of the transition T from primitive location
s. To compute the state transition probability, we assume that primitive transition
probabilities are conditionally independent, given the current marking. 4 Hence, the
composite transition probability between two markings is computed as the product of
transition probabilities from each primitive location in the first marking to a subset of
the second marking.
Specifically, assume we are given a previous state xt_1, a current state xt, an
assignment ct to C and zt to 0. Additionally, the state xt is composed of a marking
mt and an assignment to dependent variables dt. Together we denote ct and dt as -r.
Then:
](t t f P(s > m' C xt1 r) if xt_1, ct can yield xtP(xt Xt_1, ct) =1 (4.22)
0 else
where
P(s > mi C Xt|1r) PT(s, Ti) * PG(9, 7, mt-1) if 9'(g) C mt
0 else
To compute p = P(xt xt 1, ct) in equation (4), we compute the probability n
P(s > ri C xt|7r) for each primitive location s in xt_1 separately. Equation (4.23)
describes the computation of n: if there exists a transition I such that T7(g) C xt,
then n is the probability of that transition, times the probability that the guard g is
satisfied, given the previous marking and -r. If there exists no such transition Tz, then
p is 0. The probability p is then the product of n for all primitive locations s in xt_1.
However, if all satisfied transitions are insufficient to create the full marking xt, this
is, if there is a location in xt that cannot be reached through transitions satisfied by 7r
and mt_1, then p is 0. This computation is presented formally in Algorithm 4 below.
Specifying the Guard Probability
The guard probability PG(9, 7r, m) is the probability that a guard condition g E A is
enabled given a partial assignment 7r to control, observable, and dependent variables,
4This is analogous to the failure independence assumption from GDE and Livingstone [151, and is
reasonable for most engineered systems.
Algorithm 4 : Probability computation P(xtlxt-1, ct)
1: p= 1,m= 0
2: for each primitive location s E xt_1 do
3: n = 0
4: for all T' from s do
5: if 37I(g) = rilr C xo then
mar
6: m U ri
7: n = Pr(s, Ti) * PG(9, 7, nt-1)
8: break
9: end if
10: end for
11: p = p * n
12: end for
13: if m = xt then
> If the transition contains a resultant
king ri, enabled by g, such that r3 C xt.
> Record the result in m.
> Compute the prob. of taking i.
> Assume there is only one such 7 2.
> If no transition was feasible, then p becomes 0.
> Check to see if all locations in xt can be reached.
14: return p
15: else
16: return 0
17: end if
and a marking m E 2S. The guard g may be written over control and dependent
variables, as well as markings. For g to be enabled, it must be (1) from a primitive
state s E m, and (2) the constraint it represents must be satisfied by -r and m. If 7
and m are such that the satisfaction of g is known, then this probability is 1 or 0, and
is easily specified.
For example, for the actuator PHCA above:
PG(CRG, CRG= T, (IDLE}) = 1
PG(CRG, CRG=F, {IDLE}) = 0
PG(CRG, CRG= T, {UNKNOWN}) = 0
In cases where the values of variables within the scope of the guard are not known,
then the guard is indeterminate, and the guard probability is estimated in the same
manner as the observation probability, described below.
Specifying the Observation Probability
Instead of specifying the entire observation probability function along with the model,
we calculate approximately the observation function Po for a state x similar to
GDE [15]. Given the constraints C(s c xi) imposed by x, we test if each observation
in o' is entailed or refuted, giving it probability 1 or 0, respectively. If no prediction
is made, then an a priori distribution on observables is assumed (e.g., a uniform
distribution of 1/n for n possible values).
See [26] for a detailed discussion of this calculation.
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented an approach to runtime verification for mixed stochastic
systems. Formal LTL safety specifications are converted to a Deterministic Blichi
Automaton (DBA), and safety is estimated via the combined state of this automaton
and the Probabilistic Hierarchical Constraint Automaton (PHCA) plant model. This
approach is summarized by Equation (4.19). The details of Bhichi Automata were
presented in Chapter 3, and the details of PHCA were discussed in Section 4.3. The
next chapter presents empirical validation and discusses future work.
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Chapter 5
Validation and Conclusions
In this chapter I evaluate the utility of the monitoring algorithm presented in Chapter
4, as well as discuss future work.
Section 5.1 describes the experiment that was performed to test the validity and
efficiency of the algorithm. Results are presented for the example. Section 5.2 presents
possibilities for future work.
5.1 Validation
With the experiment described in this section I seek to prove that my approach
provides a capability for real-time safety monitoring of complex mixed systems. In
order for a safety monitoring capability to be able to operate in real time, it should:
1. Be capable of estimating on large models with reasonable speed and space usage,
2. Detect safety violations quickly, and
3. Detect safety violations accurately.
Any experiments should therefore seek to characterize the time and space usage of
the algorithm as IX| grows, the latency of violation detection, and the accuracy of
violation detection.
The experiment performed verifies that the safety monitoring capability is able
to quickly and accurately detect safety violations on a small example. Future work
should more completely characterize the monitor's performance on larger models.
5.1.1 Description of Implementation
The Blichi Automaton compilation and operation, the inference algorithms, and the
examples were all implemented in Java. The experiments were run on an Intel Core 2
Duo 2.16 GHz with 4 gigabytes of RAM.
5.1.2 Experimental Setup
For the experiment, I tested a small subset of the SAFELANE example from Chapter
2. This example was designed solely to validate the accuracy and speed of safety
violation detection. For this model, I tested nominal scenarios and faulty scenarios,
including both the case where the actuator experiences a modeled failure, and where
it experiences an unmodeled failure. In both cases, the safety monitor is able to detect
a safety violation.
5.1.3 SAFELANE Actuator Example
In this example I monitored the following safety statement:
w (ACTUATOR-FAIL -> (E]-CONTROL-REQUEST-GRANTED)) (5.1)
This statement was presented in Chapter 2 as an example of a safety statement written
over a hidden states of a stochastic plant. In this case, we require that if ever an
actuator fails, then the autonomous subsystem should not subsequently acquire control
of the vehicle. This is a good prototypical safety requirement. It is representative of
the kinds of statements that could be monitored, and is of typical complexity.
The Blichi Automaton for this statement is:
,AF
-CRG
-CRG
In this graphic, the proposition ACTUATOR-FAIL from Statement (5.1) is abbre-
viated as AF, and the proposition CONTROL-REQUEST-GRANTED is abbreviated as
CRG. As mentioned in Chapter 4, this nondeterministic automaton is converted into
a deterministic automaton for the purposes of estimation. The automaton used in
estimation is the following:
CRGCRAF
T
Figure 5-1: A Deterministic Blichi Automaton for testing Requirement (5.1).
PHCA Model
For this example, the actuator component of the SAFELANE system was modeled as
a Probabilistic Hierarchical Constraint Automaton. (See Figure 5-2.)
The proposition AF in the above BA is true if the actuator is in either of the
failure modes, which are broken and unknown. In this PHCA, the truth of CRG and
SAFELANE =correcting is assumed to be observable for the purpose of this example.
Additionally, the error e = ||#desired - #actuall, where #desired is the command sent
to the actuator, is known. If the time derivative of this error is positive, then the
actuator is assumed to be malfunctioning, or broken. The system may escape the
broken mode, but will be assumed to be in some unknown operating mode perpetually
if it ever behaves inconsistently with its model.
,(SAFELANE=correcting) (SAFELANE=correcting)
CRG
d(error)
de <0 - >
.000- dt -:
.0001 .
1.0 1 ...wn - .-- .-- ..--. brOken .8999
Figure 5-2: SAFELANE actuator component PHCA model.
This model exhibits probabilistic failure, as this thesis argued was necessary for
lifelong verification of mixed systems.
5.1.4 Results
For this model, the nominal observation sequences were estimated as meeting re-
quirement (5.1) with a probability greater than 99.99%. This requirement says that
SAFELANE should not receive control of the vehicle if the actuator has failed. A
nominal observation sequence is one in which a nominal system trajectory is consistent
with the observations. An example of a nominal observation sequence is the following:
t=1 2 3 4
-SLC -,SLC -,SLC
Znom=
-,CRG -CRG -CRG ...
_, >0 ,e>0 ,e> 0
in which SAFELANE is never granted control and takes no corrective action.
Estimating a sequence like Znom of 200,000 input observations took 7.2 seconds1 , at
which time the belief over the BA was B(Q) = {q = 0.99997, q2= 0.00003, qo = 0.0};
this is the steady-state belief for this observation sequence. The implementation
runtime is constant at each time step, as expected.
Fault sequences such as the two examples below are estimated as having violated
Requirement (5.1) with 100% probability. Fault sequences are those in which every
'For reference, the "slow" estimation described in Section 4.2.2 fails after 9 input observations
due to insufficient memory space.
consistent trajectory contains a component failure.
t=1 2 3 t=1 2
,_-SLC SLC SLC - ,SLC -SLC
Zfaut = Zfau 2 =
-,CRG CRG CRG -CRG CRG
,e >0 , > 0 de> 0 ,e>0 ,de>0odt dt dt dt dt
Many permutations of observation sequences were tested, and all faulty sequences
were clearly shown to be violating the safety requirement.
This experiment showed that my approach and implementation are correct. Fur-
thermore, I observed no latency in safety violation detection for such a model. I
also observed an accuracy of safety violation detection of 1, meaning that every fault
sequence was estimated as being in violation with the requirement.
5.2 Future Work
This section future work that could extend the applicability of my approach to safety
monitoring.
5.2.1 Dealing with More Complex Models
Despite the encouraging results presented above, very complex systems may require
models of sufficient size to render the monitoring approach presented in this thesis
impractical. The estimation of system safety presented in this thesis has a time
complexity that is polynomial in the number of combined system states. Specifically,
the time required to update the safety estimate at each time is of order O((IQ|X|)2,
where IQ| is the number of states of the DBA representing the safety requirement, and
IX| is the number of unique configurations of the underlying physical system. For very
complex physical systems requiring millions of states to be modeled accurately, this
time complexity may prevent the safety monitoring capability from being useful as a
real-time safety net. Additionally, the monitoring algorithm has a space complexity
that is linear in the number of combined system states. For embedded systems with
meager resources, the space required may be the limiting factor.
For such systems requiring large models, an approximate belief state update method
may produce acceptably accurate estimates. Researchers in model-based estimation
have shown examples of fast and accurate belief state update for Probabilistic Con-
current Constraint Automata (PCCA) [27] and Probabilistic Hierarchical Constraint
Automata (PHCA) [40] using greedy methods. These approximations are based on a
partial enumeration of the state space, and show promising results in terms of time
and space savings.
If the time and space constraints of the system prevent the use of exact safety
monitoring, these approximate belief state update methods provide a good starting
point for an investigation into approximate safety estimation.
5.2.2 Introducting MTL or TLTL
In order to take advantage of the expressiveness of liveness properties, future work
should include an investigation of timed logics. Liveness properties as defined by
Alpern and Schneider [3] are those that can never be definitively violated. Liveness
properties represent a large and expressive set of LTL properties, but these properties
are not strictly monitorable [6]. The issue is that liveness can only proven for infinite
executions. Additionally, as many authors have pointed out, liveness properties are
not generally strong enough to specify the true requirements of a real-time system [29].
Despite the fact that liveness requirements are not usually strong enough and are not
monitorable, the idea of liveness is important for describing the desired functionality
of a reactive system.
For example, the requirement:
(CONTROL-GRANTED A UNINTENTIONAL-LANE-DEPARTURE) -* OIN-LANE (5.2)
is descriptive of the desired functioning of the SAFELANE system. It is certainly
true that if SAFELANE is granted control of the vehicle during an unintentional
lane departure, it should eventually steer the car back into the lane. However, this
requirement is not strong enough. In reality, SAFELANE should quickly correct the
vehicle's course. It might be more accurate to require that SAFELANE complete
course correction within three seconds, for example, but LTL provides no way to
express this requirement.
Furthermore, when performing runtime verification on Requirement (5.2) one
cannot ever make the statement that the requirement has been violated. Even if
three hours have passed without the vehicle being IN-LANE since the requirement was
triggered, there is still hope that the requirement will be satisfied in the future, and
therefore the system behavior is not inconsistent with the requirement.
To take advantage of the expressiveness of eventualities while maintaining the
strength and monitorability of safety properties, timed temporal logics such as Timed
LTL [31] and Metric Temporal Logic [24] introduce time bounds on the F and U
operators (0 and U). With time bounds, these operators become much more useful
for expressing the requirements of a real-time system. Additionally, introducing time
bounds morphs a liveness statement into a monitorable form by allowing it to be
disprovable with a finite execution. In other words, adding time bounds to a liveness
property changes it from a property of the form some good thing a must eventually
happen, to a property of the form some bad thing - the passing of this finite time
interval without a - must never happen. Therefore time-bounded eventualities are
actually part of the class of safety properties defined by Alpern and Schneider [3].
TLTL and MTL are similarly expressive, but syntactically different. Requirement
(5.2) above could be expressed in MTL as follows:
EI((CONTROL-GRANTED A UNINTENTIONAL-LANE-DEPARTURE) - K< 3 IN-LANE)
where now the event IN-LANE is required to occur within 3 time units of the lane
departure. The same requirement is written in TLTL as:
EL((CONTROL-GRANTED A UNINTENTIONAL-LANE-DEPARTURE) -> >IN-LANE E [0,3])
Researchers have proven the viability of performing runtime verification using
TLTL [6] and MTL [37]. Algorithms for converting both MTL and TLTL to equivalent
automata on finite inputs have been shown, therefore the estimation methods in this
thesis could be extended to use a timed temporal logic. The increased expressiveness
of timed logics does not come without price, however, and the complexity of such an
approach remains to be investigated.
5.2.3 Diagnosis
For safety monitoring to provide the most utility in a deployed system, the system
should be able to react to detected violations by removing unsafe functions or curtailing
mission objectives. This reactive functionality may be forced to severely restrict the
system's functionality if it is unclear what components caused the safety violation. In
the worst case, the system may be forced to shut down entirely.
If a safety monitoring capability were able to not only detect safety violations, but
also to assign blame for the violation to one or more components, then the system
would have more options when choosing a safe configuration to transition to. However,
diagnosing the cause of a safety violation is an open area of research.
5.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented empirical results of runtime verification for mixed, faulty
systems. These results showed that the approach presented in this thesis is sound
and fast enough to be used in real-time for small and medium sized models. I believe
that this approach to safety monitoring is valuable as a safety net for embedded
systems post-deployment. Future work in this area should include investigation into
using larger models, employing timed logics, and providing a diagnosis capability to
supplement the safety monitoring.
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